It's possible that you've become familiar with the term "time-based one-time passwords" (TOTP) in relation to "two-factor authentication" (FA) or "multi-factor authentication" (MFA).
However, do you really understand TOTP and how they work?
The Meaning of TOTP
"Time-Based One-Time Passwords” refer to passwords that are only valid for 30-90 seconds after they have been formed with a shared secret value and the current time on the system.
Passwords are almost always composed of six-digit sequences that are changed every thirty seconds. On the other hand, some implementations of TOTP make use of four-digit codes that become invalid after a period of 90 seconds.
An open standard is used in the TOTP algorithm, and this standard is detailed in RFC 6238.
What is a shared secret?
TOTP authentication uses a shared secret in the form of a secret key that is shared between the client and the server.
To the naked eye, the Shared Secret seems to be a string with a representation in Base32 that is similar to the following:
Computers are able to comprehend and make sense of information even if it is not legible by humans in the manner in which it is presented.
The client and the server both have a copy of the shared secret safely stored on their respective systems after a single transmission of the secret.
If an adversary is able to discover the value of the shared secret, then they will be able to construct their own unique one-time passcodes that are legitimate. Because of this, every implementation of TOTP needs to pay particular attention to securely storing the shared secret in a safe manner.
What is system time?
There is a clock that is integrated into every computer and mobile phone that measures what is referred to as Unix time.
Unix time is measured in terms of the number of seconds that have passed since January 1, 1970, at 00:00:00 UTC.
Unix time appears to be nothing more than a string of numbers:
1643788666
This small number, however, is excellent for the generation of an OTP since the majority of electrical devices using Unix time clocks are sufficiently synced with one another.
Implementations of the TOTP Authentication Protocol
The use of passwords is not recommended. However, you may increase security by combining a traditional password with a time-sensitive one-time password (TOTP). This combination is known as two-factor authentication or 2FA, and it may be used to authenticate your accounts, virtual private networks (VPNs), and apps securely.
TOTP can be implemented in hardware and software tokens:
• The TOTP hardware token is a physical keychain that displays the current code on a small screen
• The TOTP soft token is a mobile application that displays a code on a phone’s screen
It makes no difference whether you use software tokens or hardware tokens. The purpose of using two different forms of authentication is to increase the level of protection afforded to your online accounts. You have access to a one-time password generator that you may use during two-factor authentication to obtain access to your account. This generator is available to you regardless of whether you have a key fob or a smartphone with an authentication app.
How does a time-based one-time password work?
The value of the shared secret is included in the generation of each time-based one-time password (TOTP), which is dependent on the current time.
To produce a one-time password, the TOTP method takes into account both the current Unix time and the shared secret value.
The counter in the HMAC-based one-time password (HOTP) method is swapped out for the value of the current time in the time-based one-time password algorithm, which is a version of the HOTP algorithm.
The one-time password (TOTP) technique is based on a hash function that, given an input of indeterminate length, generates a short character string of fixed length. This explanation avoids getting too bogged down in technical language. If you simply have the result of a hash function, you will not be able to recreate the original parameters that were used to generate it. This is one of the hash function's strengths.
It is essential to keep in mind that TOTP offers a higher level of security than HOTP. Every 30 seconds, a brand new password is produced while using TOTP. When using HOTP, a new password is not created until after the previous one has been entered and used. The fact that the one-time password for HOTP continues to work even after it has been used for authentication leaves hackers with a significant window of opportunity to mount a successful assault.
Authentication using Multiple Factors (MFA)
A user must first register their TOTP token in any multi-factor authentication (MFA) system that supports a time-based one-time password before they can use the device to connect to their account.
Some TOTP soft tokens need the registration of a different OTP generator for each account. This effectively implies that if you add two accounts to your authenticator app, the program will produce two temporary passwords, one for each account, every 30 seconds. A single TOTP soft token (authenticator program) may support an infinite number of one-time password generators. Individual one-time password generators safeguard the security of all other accounts in the case where the security of an account is compromised.
To use 2FA, a secret must be created and shared between the TOTP token and the security system. The security system's secret must then be passed to the token.
How is the shared secret sent to the token?
Typically, the security system creates a QR code and requests that the user scan it using an authenticator app.
A QR code of this type is a visual depiction of a lengthy string of letters. The shared secret is, roughly speaking, part of this lengthy sequence.
The software will string the image and extract the secret when the user scans the QR code using the authenticator app. The authenticator program may now utilize the shared secret to generate one-time passwords.
When registering a TOTP token, the secret is only sent once. Many of the concerns about stealing the private key are alleviated. An adversary can still steal the secret, but they must first physically steal the token.
It works even when you're not connected to the internet!
To use the TOTP technique, you do not need an active internet connection on your smartphone or a physical key.
The TOTP token only needs to obtain the shared secret value once. The security system and the OTP generator may thus produce successive password values without needing to communicate. As a consequence, time-based one-time passwords (TOTP) operate even when the computer is turned off.
1.1 What Are ‘Certificates’ and Why Are They Needed?
Certificates are text files on a web server, the placement and content of which confirms the identity of the responsible owner of a web resource. Owner confirmation is carried out by specially authorized companies or divisions of an organization – Certification Centers (also referred to as the CC, Certificate Authority, CA).
Additionally, certificates contain the public key required to establish an encrypted connection to work on a network in order to prevent data interception by intruders. The protocols by which this connection is established end with the letter "S", from the English word "Secure" — see HTTP(S), FTP(S), etc. This means that standard internet protocols, such as HTTP and FTP, are used over an encrypted TLS connection, whereas ordinary messages are exchanged over TCP/IP without encryption. TLS (which stands for Transport Layer Security is a protocol that ensures secure data transfer based on SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), which is another cryptographic protocol. This uses asymmetric cryptography to authenticate exchange keys so that a session can be established, symmetric encryption to further preserve the confidentiality of the session, and the cryptographic signature of messages to guarantee the delivery of information without loss. Despite the fact that it is the only TLS protocol that is actually used, due to habit, the entire family of these protocols is called SSL, and the accompanying certificates are SSL certificates.
The use of SSL certificates primarily allows you to prevent data theft by using clones of sites of well-known services, when attackers duplicate the main pages of said sites, employ similar domain names, and forge personal information forms. The user may input personal information about themselves, their documents, and payment details on fake websites. As a result, users' personal information may subsequently be used to gain unauthorized access to other resources or social networks so it can be resold, or used to steal funds from a bank account. Service owners can help customers avoid these problems by configuring HTTPS on their resource and demonstrating the authenticity of their web pages to their users directly in the browser address bar.
As mentioned above, TLS/SSL is used to encrypt traffic from the client to the web server, and this prevents intruders from intercepting traffic on public unsecured networks.
1.2 How Do They Work?
When it comes to TLS /SSL, three parties are involved: the client – the consumer of services or goods on the internet; the server – the provider of these services or goods; and the Certification Center, whose duties include ensuring that the domain name and resource belong to the organization specified in the registration information of the certificate.
The TLS/SSL algorithm works as follows:
1. The owners of the service contact the Certification Center through partners and provide information about themselves.
2. The Certification Center makes inquiries about the owners of the service. If the primary information is verified, the Certification Center issues the owners of the service with a certificate which includes the verified information and a public key.
3. The user launches a browser on a personal device and goes to the service page.
4. The browser, along with other standard operations, requests the SSL certificate while the service page is loading.
5. The service sends the browser a copy of the certificate in response.
6. The browser checks the validity period and validity of the copy of the certificate using the Certificate Centers’ pre-installed root certificates. If everything is approved, the browser sends the corresponding response to the service, signed with the client's key.
7. The service receives confirmation of the client’s verification with their digital signature and they begin an encrypted session.
Session encryption is carried out using PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). PKI is based on the following principles:
1. There is a related pair of non-interchangeable control sequences of almost random characters called keys: public or public and private, also referred to as private.
2. Any dataset can be encrypted with a public key. Because of this, the public key can be freely transmitted over the network, and an attacker will not be able to use it to harm users.
3. The private key is known only to its owner and can decrypt the received data stream into structured information that has been encrypted with a public key paired with it. The private key should be stored on the service and used only for local decryption of messages that have been received. If an attacker is able to gain access to a private key, then procedures for revoking and reissuing the certificate must be initiated to make the previous certificate useless. A leak of a private key is called a compromise.
An SSL certificate from a Certificate Authority is one way of distributing a server’s public key to clients in unsecured networks. After verifying the validity of the certificate, the client encrypts all outgoing messages with the public key attached to the certificate and decrypts incoming messages with the private one, thereby ensuring a secure communication channel.
1.3 Who Releases Them?
Certificates are issued by Certification Centers upon the request of customers. The Certification Center is an independent third–party organization that officially verifies the information specified in a certificate request: i.e. whether the domain name is valid, whether a network resource with this name belongs to a specific company or individual to whom it is registered; whether the site of the company or individual to whom the SSL certificate was issued is genuine, and other checks. The most famous international Certification Centers are Comodo, Geotrust, GoDaddy, GlobalSign, Symantec. The root SSL certificates of these Certification Authorities are pre-installed as trusted in all popular browsers and operating systems.
It is often more cost-effective to purchase certificates not directly from the Certification Center but from their partners instead, as they offer wholesale discounts. In Russia, many companies and hosting providers that have their own tariffs for the SSL certificate service sell certificates from well-known Certification Centers.
2. Advanced Information about Certificates
2.1 Which Crypto Algorithms Are Used?
The following algorithms are used to establish a secure connection:
Encryption algorithm
Hashing algorithms
Authentication algorithms
The most commonly used encryption algorithms for cryptographic operations in TLS/SSL are combinations of the algorithms RSA (an initialism of the names of the creators Rivest, Shamir and Adleman), DSA (which stands for Digital Signature Algorithm, patented by the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the USA) and several variations of the Diffie–Hellman algorithm or DH, such as a one-time DH (Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman, EDH) and DH based on elliptic curves (Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman, ECDH). These Diffie-Hellman variations, unlike the original algorithm, provide progressive secrecy, i.e. when previously recorded data cannot be decrypted after a certain amount of time — even if it was possible to obtain the server's secret key — because the original parameters of the algorithm are generated again when the channel is re-established after a forced break when the connection has timed out.
Hashing algorithms are based on a family of mathematical functions for calculating the hash SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm). The hash function allows you to convert the original data array into a string of a certain length, and this length determines the amount of processing time and the computing power required. All encryption algorithms today support the SHA2 hashing algorithm, most often SHA-256. SHA-512 has a similar structure, but in it the word length is 64 bits rather than 32, the number of rounds in the cycle is 80 rather than 64, and the message is divided into blocks of 1024 bits rather than 512 bits. Previously, SHA1 and MD5 algorithms were used for the same purpose, but today they are considered vulnerable to attack. Modern services use keys 64 bits long and higher. The current version of the SHA-3 algorithm (Keccak), uses an amount necessary to verify the integrity of the transmitted data — MAC (Message Authentication Code). The MAC uses the mapping function to represent message data as a fixed length value, and then hashes the message.
In modern versions of the TLS protocol, HMAC is used (Hashed Message Authentication Code), which uses a hash function immediately with a shared secret key. This key is transmitted along with the flow of information, and to confirm authenticity, both parties must use the same secret keys. This provides greater security.
The General Algorithm of SSL Operation
1. Handshake protocol. The connection confirmation (handshake) protocol is the order of operations performed directly during the initialization of the SSL connection between the client and the server. The protocol allows the server and client to carry out mutual authentication, determine the encryption algorithm and MAC, as well as secret keys to protect data during a further SSL session. The handshake protocol is used by participants at the stage before data exchange. Each message transmitted as part of the handshake protocol contains the following fields:
Type is the category of messages. There are 10 categories of messages.
Length refers to the length of each message in bytes.
The content is the message itself and its parameters.
During the handshake, the following stages take place:
1.1 Determination of supported algorithms. At the first stage, the connection between the client and the server is initiated and the encryption algorithms are selected. First, the client sends a welcome message to the server, before entering response-waiting mode. After receiving the client's welcome message, the server returns its own welcome message to the client to confirm the connection. The client's welcome message includes the following data:
The maximum SSL version number that the client can support
A 32-byte random number used to generate the master secret
Session ID
A list of cipher suites
A list of compression algorithms
The format of the list of cipher suites is as follows:
<1>_<2>_<3>_<4>
Wherein lies:
The name of the protocol, for example, "SSL" or "TLS".
Key exchange algorithm (with an indication of the authentication algorithm).
The encryption algorithm.
Hashing algorithm. For example, the entry "SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" means that the fragment "DHE_RSA" (temporary Diffie-Hellman with RSA digital signature) is defined as a key exchange algorithm; the fragment "DES_CBC" is defined as an encryption algorithm; and the fragment "SHA" is defined as a hashing algorithm. As will be discussed later in TLSv1.3, the key exchange and encryption protocols are combined into an authenticated encryption algorithm with attached data (AEAD), so the entry there will be shorter. Example: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. The server response includes the following fields:
The SSL version number. On the client side, the lowest version number supported by the client and the largest version number supported by the server are compared. Depending on the server’s settings, selection priority can be given to either the client or server.
A 32-byte random number used to generate the master secret.
Session ID.
A set of ciphers from the list of ciphers supported by the client.
Compression method from the list of compression methods supported by the client.
1.2 Server authentication and key exchange
At the second stage, all messages are sent by the server. This stage is divided into 4 steps:
The sending of a digital certificate to the client so they can use the server's public key for authentication purposes.
Key exchange on the server. Depending on the established algorithm, this step may be skipped.
Client certificate request. Depending on the settings, the server may require the client to send their own certificate.
A message confirming that the server authentication and key exchange stage is complete, before moving on to the next stage.
1.3 Client authentication and key exchange:
At the third stage, all messages are sent by the client. This stage is divided into 3 steps:
The sending of the certificate to the server — if the server requested it (this depends on the established algorithm). If the algorithm includes this, the client can authenticate on the server. For example, in IIS, you can configure mandatory authentication of the client certificate.
Client key exchange (Pre-master-secret) – the sending of the master key to the server, which will later be encrypted using the server key. The client knows the master key and in case of server substitution will be able to terminate the connection.
Signing a random number to confirm ownership of the certificate's public key. This stage also depends on the algorithm chosen.
1.4 Server shutdown
At the fourth stage, messages are exchanged directly and errors are monitored. If an error is detected, the alarm protocol comes into effect. This stage consists of exchanging session messages: the first two messages come from the client, and the last two come from the server.
2. The Key Generation Process
To ensure the integrity and confidentiality of information, SSL requires six encryption secrets: four keys and two values of the initialization vector (IV, see below). The information’s authenticity is guaranteed by an authentication key (for example, HMAC). The data is then encrypted by a public key, and data blocks are created based on IV. The keys required by SSL are unidirectional, so when a client is hacked, the data obtained cannot be used to hack the server.
3. Record Agreement (Record Protocol)
The recording protocol is used after a connection between the client and the server has been successfully established, and when the client and server have passed mutual authentication and have determined the algorithm they will use to exchange information about the algorithms used. The recording protocol implements the following functions:
Confidentiality by using the secret key defined at the handshake stage;
Integrity by analyzing the MAC defined at the handshake.
4. Alarm Protocol
When the client and server detect an error, they send a message recognizing this. If it is a critical error, the algorithm immediately closes the SSL connection, and both sides first delete the session details: the identifier, secret, and key. Each error message is 2 bytes long. The first byte indicates the type of error. If the connection fails, the value is 1, while if a critical error is detected, it is 2. The second byte indicates the nature of the error.
2.2 Versions of SSL (SSL, TLS) — and How They Differ
During the initial installation of a secure connection between the client and the server, the protocol is selected from those supported by both sides from the set of SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3.
Earlier versions of the SSL protocol are not used. The SSLv1 version was never made public. The SSLv2 version was released in February 1995, but it contained many security flaws that led to the development of SSLv3. Various IT companies have begun to attempt to implement their own versions of secure data transfer protocols. In order to prevent disunity and monopolization in the field of network security, the international community of designers, scientists, network operators, and providers (The Internet Engineering Task Force [IETF]), which was created by the Internet Architecture Council in 1986, is involved with developing protocols and organizing the internet, specifically regarding the standardized TLS protocol version 1, slightly different from SSL 3.0.
The technical details of the protocol are recorded by the release of a document called RFC (Request for Comments, working proposal). These documents can be found on the IETF website: www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcXXXX.txt , where XXXX is a four-digit RFC number. Thus, the TLSv1 version is fixed in RFC 2246, the TLSv1.1 version is fixed in RFC 4346, the TLSv1 version.2 in RFC 5246, and the TLSv1 version.3 in RFC 8446. In addition, RFC 3546 defines several extensions for cases when TLS is used in systems with limited bandwidth, such as wireless networks; RFC 6066 defines a number of additional TLS changes made to the extended client greeting format (presented in TLSv1.2); RFC 6961 defines a method for reducing traffic when a client requests information about the status of a certificate from the server; and, finally, RFC 7925 defines what happens to TLS (and DTLS) when it is used in IoT (Internet Of Things) to exchange data between hardware and other physical objects without human intervention.
As mentioned above, the TLSv1 protocol was released as an update to SSLv3. RFC 2246 states that "the differences between this protocol and SSLv3 are not hugely significant, but they are significant enough to exclude interaction between TLSv1 and SSLv3."
In contrast to the TLS Version 1.0, the TLSv1.1 protocol provides:
Added protection against attacks using CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), when each block of plaintext is associated with the previous block of ciphertext before encryption. 1. The implicit initialization vector (the original pseudorandom number initiating the calculation of the further cipher, IV) was replaced by an explicit one which is not secret, but nonetheless cannot be predicted in a reasonable timeframe. 2. A change in the handling of block filling errors when a data packet is expanded to a fixed block size.
Support for registering server IP address parameters and other network information.
The TLS 1.2 protocol is based on the TLS 1.1 specification. This is the most common at the moment. The main differences include:
The combination of MD5–SHA-1 hashing algorithms in a pseudorandom function (PRF) has been replaced by the more secure SHA-256, with the possibility of using a set of ciphers, the specified function.
The hash size in the finished message has become at least 96 bits.
The combination of MD5–SHA-1 hashing algorithms in the digital signature has been replaced by a single hash agreed upon during the handshake, which is SHA-1 by default.
The implementation of the function of selecting encryption and hashing algorithms for the client and server.
The extension of support for authenticated encryption ciphers used mainly for Galois/Counter mode (GCM) and CCM mode for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The addition of TLS extension definitions and AES cipher suites.
The ending of backward compatibility with SSLv2 as part of the 6176 RFC. Thus, TLS sessions have ceased to negotiate the use of SSL version 2.0.
The TLS 1.3 protocol is based on the TLS 1.2 specification. Internet services are gradually transitioning to this protocol. The main differences include:
The separation of key matching and authentication algorithms from cipher suites.
The ending of support for unstable and less-used named elliptic curves.
The ending of support for MD5 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash functions.
The need for digital signatures even when using the previous configuration.
The integration of the HMAC-based key generation function and a semi-ephemeral DH sentence.
The introduction of support for a one-time resumption of the receive-transmit session (Round Trip Time or 1-RTT) handshakes, and initial support for zero time for resuming the receive-transmit session (the name of the 0-RTT mode).
Session keys obtained using a set of long-term keys can no longer be compromised when attackers gain access to them. This property is called perfect direct secrecy (PFS) and is implemented through the use of ephemeral keys during the DH key agreement.
The ending of support for many insecure or outdated functions, including compression, renegotiation, ciphers other than AEAD-block encryption modes (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data), non-PFS key exchange (including static RSA key exchange and static DH key exchange), configurable EDH groups, elliptic curve point ECDH format negotiation, encryption modification specification protocol, UNIX time welcome message, etc.
The prevention of SSL or RC4 negotiation that was previously possible to ensure backward compatibility.
The ceasing of use of a record-level version number and fixing the number to improve backward compatibility.
The addition of the ChaCha20 stream cipher with the Poly1305 message authentication code.
The addition of digital signature algorithms Ed25519 and Ed448.
The addition of the x25519 and x448 key exchange protocols.
The addition of support for sending multiple responses to the Online Certificate Status Protocol, OCSP.
The encryption of all confirmations of receiving and transmitting a block of data after calling the server.
2.3 What Is PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)?
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a system of software, hardware and regulatory methods that solve cryptographic tasks based on a pair of private and public keys. The PKI is based on the exclusive trust of the exchange participants in the certifying center in the absence of information about each other. The certifying center, in turn, confirms or refutes the ownership of the public key to the specified person who owns the corresponding private key.
The main components of PKI:
The certifying center or Certification Center is an organization that performs, among other things, legal verification of data on participants in a network interaction (client or server). From a technical point of view, the Certification Center is a software and hardware complex that manages the lifecycle of certificates, but not their direct use. It is a trusted third party.
A public key certificate (most often just ‘certificate’) consists of client or server data and public key signed with the electronic signature of the Certifying Center. The issuance of a public key certificate by a Certification Authority ensures that the person specified in the certificate also owns the private part of a single key pair.
Registration Center (RC) is an intermediary of the Certification Center that acts on the basis of trust in the root Certification Center. The Root Certification Center trusts the data received by the Registration Center while verifying the information about the subject. After verifying the authenticity of the information, the Registration Center signs it with its own key and transmits the data it has received to the root Certification Center. The Root Certification Authority verifies the registration authority’s signature and, if successful, issues a certificate. One Registration Center can work with several Certification Centers (in other words, it can consist of several PKIs), just as one Certification Center can work with several Registration Centers. This component may not be present in the corporate infrastructure.
Repository – a repository of valid certificates and a list of revoked certificates that are constantly updated. The list of revoked certificates (Certificate Revocation List, CRL) contains data on issued certificates whose paid period or validity period have elapsed, as well as certificates of resource owners that have been compromised or have not been authenticated.
A Certificate Archive is a repository of all certificates ever issued (including expired certificates) within the current PKI. The certificate archive is used for security incident investigations, which include verifying all data that has ever been signed.
The Request Center is the personal account of the Certification Center’s clients, where end users can request a new certificate or revoke an existing one. It is implemented most often in the form of a web interface for the registration center.
End users are clients, applications, or systems that own a certificate and use the public key management infrastructure.
3. How the Browser Works with SSL Certificates
3.1 What Happens in the Browser When the Certificate Is Checked?
Regardless of any extensions, browsers should always check a certificate’s basic information, such as the signature or the publisher. Steps for verifying Certificate Information:
1. Checking the integrity of the certificate. This is done with the cryptographic Verify operation with a public key. If the signature is invalid, then the certificate is considered fake: it has been modified after it was issued by a third party, so it is rejected.
2. Verifying the validity of the certificate. This is done with the cryptographic Decrypt operation, and by reading the accompanying information. The certificate is considered valid as long as the period for which the client has paid has not elapsed, or the expiration date has not passed. The expiration date of the certificate is the length of time for which the owner’s identity is validated by the Certifying Center that issued the certificate. Browsers reject any certificates with an expiration date that has expired before or started after the date and time of verification.
3. Checking the certificate revocation status. This is done with the cryptographic Decrypt operation, and loading and reconciliation with CRL. A number of circumstances, for example, law enforcement agencies’ appeals, the identification of a change in the source information or confirmation of the fact that the server's private key has been compromised, can make the certificate invalid before its expiration date. To do this, the certificate is added to the CRL on the side of the Certifying Center.
Certification authorities periodically release a new version of the signed CRL, and it is distributed in public repositories. Browsers access the latest version of the CRL when verifying the certificate. The main drawback of this approach is that it limits verification to the CRL issuance period. The browser will be informed of the revocation only after it receives the current CRL. Depending on the policy of the signing Certification Authority, the CRL update period can be calculated in weeks.
When working with TLSv2 and TLSv3, the browser can use the OCSP Network Certificate Status detection protocol described in RFC 6960. OCSP allows the browser to request the revocation status of a particular certificate online (the reply operation). If the OCSP is configured correctly, the verification of certificates in the CRL is much faster and avoids the use of actually revoked certificates until the next CRL update. There is an OCSP Stapling technology that allows you to include a copy of the response to the certificate status request from the Certifying Center in the headers of the HTTP responses of the web server, which in turn increases the performance and speed of data exchange.
4. Verification of the certificate publisher by the certificate chain.
Certificates are usually associated with several Certification Authorities: the root authority, which is the owner of the public key for signing certificates, and a number of intermediary ones, which refer to previous owners of the public key all the way up to the root one.
Browsers check the certificates of each Certifying Authority for being in the chain of trust with the root at the head. For added security, most PKI implementations also verify that the public key of the Certifying Authority matches the key with which the current certificate was signed. Thus, self-signed certificates are determined, because they have the same publisher only on the server where they were issued, or were added to the list of root certificates.
The X.509 v3 format allows you to determine which chain certificates should be checked. These restrictions rarely affect the average Internet user, although they are quite common in corporate systems at the development and debugging stage.
5. Checking the domain name restriction
The certification authority may restrict the validity of the certificate on a server with a specific domain name or a list of the organization's child domains. Domain name restrictions are often used for intermediate Certification Authority certificates purchased from a publicly trusted Certification Authority to exclude the possibility of issuing valid certificates for third-party domains.
6. Checking the certificate issuance policy
The Certificate Issuance Policy is a legal document published by the Certification Authority, which describes in detail the procedures for issuing and managing certificates. Certification authorities can issue a certificate in accordance with one or more policies, links to which are added to the information of the issued certificate so that the verifying parties can validate these policies before deciding whether to trust this certificate. For example, restrictions may be imposed on the region or time frame (for the period of technological maintenance of the Certification Center software).
7. Checking the length of the certificate chain
The X.509 v3 format allows publishers to define the maximum number of intermediate certification authorities that can support a certificate. This restriction was introduced after the possibility of forgery of a valid certificate was demonstrated in 2009 by including a self-signed certificate in a very long chain.
8. Verifying the public key assignment
The browser checks the purpose of the public key contained in the certificate encryption, signatures, certificate signature and so on. Browsers reject certificates, for example, if a server certificate is found with a key intended only for CRL signing.
9. Checking the rest of the chain certificates
The browser checks each certificate of the chain. If the verification data was completed without errors, then the entire operation is considered valid. If any errors occur, the chain is marked as invalid and a secure connection is not established.
3.2 How to View Certificate Information and Check that Everything Is Working Correctly
The security certificate can be checked directly in the browser. All modern browsers display certificate information visibly in the address bar. If a secure connection with a web resource is established, a lock icon is displayed on the left of the browser address bar. In case of an error, the crossed-out word "HTTPS" or an open lock icon will be displayed. Depending on the type of browser and its version, the type of icons and behavior when working with SSL certificates may differ. Below are examples of images for different versions of modern browsers:
Google Chrome
Mozilla Firefox
Opera
Microsoft Edge
Chrome for Android
Safari for iOS
To view the details of the certificate, click on the lock icon and in the subsequent menu, click on the option that outlines the security details. Information about the certificate will appear after clicking on the appropriate button or information link.
Google Chrome
Mozilla Firefox
Microsoft Edge
Chrome for Android
3.3 A Message that the Browser Does Not Trust the Certificate
Most browsers display a security warning. These warnings inform you that the certificate has not been verified by a trusted certificate authority.
There are a number of reasons why an SSL certificate may be considered invalid in the browser. The most common reasons are:
Errors in the certificate chain installation process, the intermediate certificate is missing;
The SSL certificate has expired;
The SSL certificate is valid only for the primary domain, not for subdomains;
A self-signed SSL certificate has been used, or the root certificate of the Certification Authority has not been added to the trusted list on the current device.
4. Certification Centers
4.1 More Details about the Certification Centers
As mentioned above, the main task of the Certification Center is to confirm the authenticity of encryption keys using electronic signature certificates. The overarching operating principle can be described by the phrase "users do not trust each other, but everyone trusts the Certifying Center."
Any HTTPS interaction is based on the fact that one participant has a certificate signed by the Certification Authority, and the other attempts to verify the authenticity of this certificate. Verification will be successful if both participants trust the same Certification Authority. To solve this problem, the Certification Center’s certificates are preinstalled in operating systems and browsers. If the Certification Authority itself has issued a certificate, it is called a root certificate. A certificate issued by a partner of the Certification Authority with which it has a trust relationship is called an intermediate certificate. As a result, a tree of certificates is formed with a chain of trust between them.
By installing the certificate of the Certifying Center in the system, you can trust the certificates that have been signed with it. A certificate (particularly for HTTPS) that is issued but not signed by a root or intermediate Certification authority is called a self-signed certificate and is considered untrusted on all devices where this certificate is not added to the root/intermediate lists.
According to the distribution level of certificates, the Certification Center can be international, regional, and corporate. The public key management infrastructure’s activities are carried out in accordance with the regulations of the appropriate level: i.e. public directives recorded by the international community of Internet users, the legislation of the region, or the relevant provisions of the organization.
The main functions of the certification center are:
verifying the identity of future certificate users;
issuing certificates to users;
revoking certificates;
maintaining and publishing lists of revoked certificates (Certificate Revocation List/CRL), which are used by public key infrastructure clients when they decide whether to trust a certificate.
Additional functions of the certification center are:
Generating key pairs, one of which will be included in the certificate.
Upon request, when resolving conflicts, the UC can verify the authenticity of the electronic signature of the owner of the certificate issued by this UC.
Browsers and operating systems of devices fix the trust of the Certifying Center by accepting the root certificate into their storage – a special database of root certificates of Certifying centers. The storage is placed on the user's device after installing the OS or browser. For example, Windows maintains its root certificate store in operating systems, Apple has a so-called trust store, Mozilla (for its Firefox browser) creates a separate certificate store. Many mobile operators also have their own storage. Regional and corporate should be added either at the stage of software certification in the country, or by contacting the technical support of the organization.
Regional representatives of the world Certification Centers have the authority to make legal requests for the activities of organizations related to the publication of web resources. For corporate Certification Centers, this is not necessary, since they usually have access to the internal information of the organization. For security purposes, Certification Authorities should not issue digital certificates directly from the root certificate transmitted to operators, but only through one or more Intermediate Certificate Authority, ICA. These intermediate Certification Authorities are required to comply with security recommendations in order to minimize the vulnerability of the root Certification authority to hacker attacks, but there are exceptions. For example, GlobalSign is one of the few certification authorities that have always (since 1996) used ICA.
Certificates come in different formats and support not only SSL, but also the authentication of people and devices, as well as certifying the authenticity of code and documents.
The universal algorithm for obtaining a certificate from the Certification Center:
1. Private key generation 2. Creation of a certificate signing request (CSR request) 3. Procurement of a certificate signed by the Certificate Authority’s root certificate after passing the checks 4. Configuration of the web server for your resource
Since browsers have a copy of the international Certification Authority’s root certificate, as well as a number of intermediate certificates from the chain of trust, the browser can check whether a certificate was signed by a trusted certification authority. When users or an organization create a self-signed certificate, the browser does not trust it as it knows nothing about the organization, so the root certificate of the organization must be manually added to all controlled devices. These certificates will become trusted after this.
4.2 What Are Root Certificates?
A root certificate is a file that contains service information about the Certification Authority. Special software or a library that verifies, encrypts and decrypts information is called a crypto provider (a provider of cryptographic functions). The cryptographer gets access to the encrypted information, thereby confirming the authenticity of the personal electronic signature.
A chain of trust for the certificates is then built based on the certifying center’s root certificate. Any electronic signature issued by the Certifying Center only works if there is a root certificate.
The root certificate stores information with the dates of its validity. The cryptographic provider can also get access to the organization's registry through the root certificate.
4.3 What Is a Certificate Chain?
Historically and technologically, certain Certification Centers are widely recognized among SSL users, and as a result, it was agreed that the certificates they issued would be considered root certificates, and they would always be trusted. Regional Certifying certificates, in turn, can be confirmed by the root Certifying center. In turn, they can confirm other certificates, forming a chain of trust to certificates. The Certifying Center acts as a guarantor-certifier which issues an SSL certificate at the request of the owner of a web resource.
The certificate and the web resource to which it is issued are certified by an electronic digital signature (EDS). This signature indicates who the owner of the certificate is and records its contents, that is, it allows you to check whether it has been changed by someone after it was issued and signed.
The list of certificates of root Certifying centers and their public keys is initially placed in the operating system’s software storage on the users' workstation, in the browser, and in other applications that use SSL.
If the chain of sequentially signed certificates ends with the root certificate, all certificates included in this chain are considered confirmed.
Root certificates located on the user's workstation are stored in a container protected by the operating system from accidental access. However, the user can add new root certificates themselves, and this is a source of potential security problems.
By carrying out certain actions and accessing an attacked workstation, an attacker can include their own certificate among the root certificates and use it to decrypt the data that is received.
The Root Certification Center can be formed by the government of a particular country or the leaders of an organization. In these cases, root Certification Centers will not operate everywhere, but they can nonetheless be used quite successfully in a specific country or within a specific enterprise.
At present, the list of root certification authorities on the user's computer can be automatically changed when updating the operating system, software products, or manually by the system administrator.
Certification centers can issue a variety of SSL certificates linked by what is known as a tree structure. The root certificate is the root of the tree, with the secret key with which other certificates are signed. All intermediate certificates that are at a lower level inherit the degree of trust that the root certificate has. SSL certificates located further down the structure receive trust in the same way from the Certifying Centers located higher up the chain. Using the example of the Comodo Certification Center, the structure of SSL certificates can explained as follows:
1. The root certificate of the Comodo Certification Authority: AddTrustExternalCARoot
2. Intermediate Certificates: PositiveSSL CA 2, ComodoUTNSGCCA, UTNAddTrustSGCCA, EssentialSSLCA, Comodo High-Assurance Secure Server CA
3. SSL certificates for individual domains
5. General Information about Certificate Types
5.1 Paid Trusted Certificates
The purchase of trusted certificates, except in some cases, is a paid service.
5.1.1 Where and How to Buy
In most cases in Russia, web resource hosting companies or partner organizations of international Certification centers provide SSL certificate services. It is possible to purchase certificates directly from Certification Centers, but such certificates are usually more expensive than from partners who purchase them in bulk.
The procedure for purchasing an SSL certificate is no different from purchasing other internet services. It entails:
1. Selecting a supplier and going to the SSL certificates order page.
2. Selecting the appropriate SSL certificate and clicking the purchase button.
3. Entering the name of your domain and selecting the protection option — for one domain or Wildcard certificate for a group of subdomains.
4. Paying for the service in whichever way is most convenient.
5. Continue configuring the service in accordance with the following parameters:
a. The number of domains that the certificate protects (i.e. one or more). b. Subdomain support. c. The speed of release. Certificates with domain-only validation are issued the quickest, while certificates with EV validation are issued the slowest. d. Most Certifiers offer unlimited certificate reissues. This is required if there are mistakes in the organization data. e. Warranty – for some certificates there is a $10,000 warranty. This is a guarantee not for the certificate buyer, but rather for the visitor of a site that installs a certificate. If a site visitor with such a certificate suffers from fraud and loses money, the Certification Center undertakes to compensate the stolen funds up to the amount specified in the guarantee. In practice, such cases are extremely rare. f. Free trial period – Symantec Secure Site, Geotrust Rapidssl, Comodo Positive SSL, Thawte SSL Web Server certificates have paid certificates. There are also free certificates. g. Refund – almost all certificates have a 30-day refund policy, although there are certificates without this.
5.1.2 Approximate Cost
SSL certificates can be separated into different groups based on their properties.
1. Regular SSL certificates. These are issued instantly and confirm only one domain name. Cost: from $20 per year.
2. SGC certificates. These support customers with increasing the level of encryption. Server Gated Cryptography technology allows you to forcibly increase the encryption level to 128 bits in older browsers that supported only 40 or 56 bit encryption. Cryptography is used to solve this problem, but it cannot cope with the other vulnerabilities present in unsecure browsers, so there are a number of root Certification centers that do not support this technology. Cost: from $300 per year.
3. Wildcard certificates. They provide encryption of all subdomains of the same domain by mask. For example, there is a domain domain.com; if the same certificate must be installed on support.domain.com, forum.domain.com and billing.domain.com, customers can issue a certificate for *.domain.com. Depending on the number of subdomains that need the certificate, it may be more cost-effective to purchase several ordinary SSL certificates individually. Examples of wildcard certificates: Comodo PositiveSSL Multi-Domain Wildcard and Comodo Multi-Domain Wildcard SSL. Cost: from $180 per year.
4. SAN Certificates Subject Alternative Name technology allows customers to use one certificate for several different domains hosted on the same server. Such certificates are also referred to as UCC (Unified Communication Certificate), MDC (Multi-domain certificate) or EC (Exchange Certificate). Generally, one SAN certificate includes up to 5 domains, but this number can be increased for an additional fee. Cost: from $395 per year.
5. Certificates with IDN support Certificates with national domain support (International Domain Name, such as *.US, *.CN, *.UK). Not all certificates can support IDN. This must be clarified with the Certification Center. Certificates supporting IDN include:
Thawte SSL123 Certificate;
Thawte SSL Web Server;
Symantec Secure Site;
Thawte SGC SuperCerts;
Thawte SSL Web Server Wildcard;
Thawte SSL Web Server with EV;
Symantec Secure Site Pro;
Symantec Secure Site with EV;
Symantec Secure Site Pro with EV.
As is mentioned above, partners of Certification Centers can provide significant discounts on prices — starting at $10 — or offer service packages.
5.1.3. Certificate Validation
Certificates are divided into the following levels of validation:
1. DV
Domain Validation, or certificates with domain validation. The certification authority verifies that the client who requests the certificate controls the domain that needs the certificate. A network service for verifying the ownership of WHOIS web resources is used to do this. This type of certificate is the cheapest and most popular, but it is not completely secure, since it contains only information about the registered domain name in the CN field (CommonName is the common domain name of a web resource).
2. OV
Organization Validation, or certificates with organization verification. The certification center verifies the affiliation of a commercial, non-profit or government organization to the client, who must provide legal information when purchasing. This type of certificate is seen as more reliable, since it meets the RFC standards and also confirms the registration data of the owner company in the following fields:
O (Organization – name of the organization);
OU (Organizational Unit – name of the organization's division);
L (Locality – name of the locality of the organization’s legal address);
S (State or Province Name – name of the territorial and administrative unit of the organization’s legal address);
C (Country Name – the name of the organization's country).
The certification center can contact the company directly to confirm this information. The certificate contains information about the person that confirmed it, but not data about the owner. An OV certificate for a private person is called IV (individual validation/ individual verification) and verifies the identity of the person requesting the certificate.
3. EV
Extended validation, or a certificate with extended validation. The Certification Center verifies the same data as the OV, but in accordance with stricter standards set by CA/Browser Forum. CA/Browser Forum (Certification Authority Browser Forum)is a voluntary consortium of certification authorities, developers of Internet browsers and software for secure email, operating systems, and other applications with PKI support. The Consortium publishes industry recommendations governing the issuing and management of certificates. This type of certificate is considered the most reliable. Previously, when using these certificates in a browser, the color of the address bar changed and the name of the organization was displayed. It is widely used by web resources that conduct financial transactions and require a high level of confidentiality. However, many sites prefer to redirect users to make payments to external resources confirmed by certificates with extended verification, while using OV certificates which are secure enough to protect the rest of the user data.
5.1.4. The Setup Process (General Information, What Is CSR?)
To initiate the certificate issuing process, a CSR request must be made. Technically, a CSR request is a file that contains a small fragment of encrypted data about the domain and the company to which the certificate is issued. The public key is also stored in this file.
The CSR generation procedure depends entirely on the software used on your server, and is most often performed using the settings in the administrative panel of your hosting. If your hosting does not provide this, then you can use online services to generate a CSR request, or alternatively you can turn to specialized software, such as OpenSSL, GnuTLS, Network Security Services, etc. After generating the CSR, the private key will also be generated.
To successfully generate a CSR, you need to enter data about the organization that has requested the certificate. The information must be entered in the Latin alphabet. The following parameters are sufficient:
Country Name — the country of registration of the organization in two-letter format. For the USA — US;
State or Province Name — region, region of registration of the organization. For New York — New York;
Locality Name — the city where the organization is registered. For New York — New York;
Organization Name — the name of the organization. For individuals, "Private Person" is indicated;
Common Name — the domain name of those who have requested the certificate;
Self–signed certificates are SSL certificates created by the service developers themselves. A pair of keys for them is generated through specialized software, for example, OpenSSL. Such a communication channel may well be used for internal purposes, i.e. between devices within your network or applications at the development stage.
5.3. Let’s Encrypt
Let's Encrypt is an Authentication Center that provides free X.509 cryptographic certificates for encrypting HTTPS data transmitted over the Internet and other protocols used by servers on the Internet. The process of issuing certificates is fully automated. The service is provided by the public organization Internet Security Research Group (ISRG).
The Let's Encrypt project was started to translate most of the Internet sites to HTTPS. Unlike commercial Certification centers, this project does not require payment, reconfiguration of web servers, use of e-mail, or the processing of expired certificates. This simplifies the installation and configuration of TLS encryption. For example, on a typical Linux-based web server, you need to run two commands that will configure HTTPS encryption, receive and install a certificate in about 20-30 seconds.
Let's Encrypt root certificates are installed as trusted by major software vendors, including Microsoft, Google, Apple, Mozilla, Oracle and Blackberry.
The Let's Encrypt Certification Authority issues DV certificates with a validity period of 90 days. It has no plans to start issuing OV or EV Certificates, although it began providing support for Wildcard certificates some time ago.
The key to the root certificate of the RSA standard has been stored in the HSM hardware storage since 2015 and is not connected to the network. This root certificate is signed by two intermediate root certificates, which were also signed by the IdenTrust certification authority. One of the intermediate certificates is used to issue sites’ final certificates, while the second is kept as a backup in storage that is not connected to the Internet, in case the first certificate is compromised. Since the root certificate of the IdenTrust center is preinstalled in most operating systems and browsers as a trusted root certificate, the certificates issued by the Let's Encrypt project are verified and accepted by clients — despite the absence of the ISRG root certificate in the trusted list.
The Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) authentication protocol is used to automatically issue a certificate to the destination site. In this protocol, a series of requests are made to the web server that seeks a signature for the certificate to confirm the ownership of the domain (DV). To receive requests, the ACME client configures a special TLS server, which is polled by the ACME server using Server Name Indication (Domain Validation using Server Name Indication, DVSNI).
Validation is carried out repeatedly, using different network paths. DNS records are pulled from a variety of geographically distributed locations to prevent DNS spoofing attacks. This is when domain name cache data is changed by an attacker in order to return a false IP address and redirect the intermediary to the attacker's resource (or any other resource on the network)1.
6. Paid Trusted Certificates
6.1 Usage on Windows Server and IIS
6.1.1 What Are the Formats of the Private Key?
These are today’s private key formats:
1. PEM format
This format is most often used by Certification Authorities. PEM certificates most often have extensions *.pem, *.crt, *.cer or *.key (for private keys) and others. For example, the package file SSL.com The CA available in the download table in the order of the certificate has the extension *.ca-bundle. The contents of the files are encrypted using Base64 and contain the strings "--BEGIN CERTIFICATE--" and "--END CERTIFICATE--".
This certificate format is common in Linux OS. Multiple PEM certificates and even a private key can be included in one file, one under the other. But most servers, such as Apache, expect the certificate and private key to be in different files.
2. PKCS#7/P7B format
PKCS#7 or P7B format certificates are usually saved in Base64 ACVII format and have the extension *.p7b or *.p7c. The P7B certificate contains the strings "--BEGIN PKCS7--" and "--END PKCS7--". This format contains only the certificate and certificate chain, but not the private key. Several commonly-used platforms support this format, including Microsoft Windows and Java Tomcat.
3. PKCS#12/PFX format
PKCS#12 or PFX format is a binary format for saving a certificate, any intermediate certificates, and a private key in one encrypted file. PFX files are usually saved with the extension *.pfx or *.p12. As a rule, this format is used on Windows certificates to export/import the certificate and private key 2.
6.1.2 How to Generate a CSR Request
To generate a CSR request in IIS 10, perform the following operations:
1. Run IIS from the iis.msc command line or from the visual interface.
2. Select your server from the Connections list and click the Server Certificates button.
3. On the Server Certificates page, click the Create Certificate Request link in the Actions block.
4. In the Request Certificate window of the wizard, fill in the CSR fields and click Next.
5. In the Cryptographic Service Provider Properties window of the wizard, select the required cryptographic provider, depending on the desired algorithm and the key length, and then click Next.
6. In the File Name window of the wizard, specify the path to the CSR being created, and then click Finish.
To send the finished CSR to the Certification Center, open the file in a text editor and copy the contents to the web form of the certificate provider.
6.1.3 How to Create a Private Key
As a result of creating the CSR, the private key will be created automatically by IIS. Viewing is available on the Certificates console snap-in in the Personal or Web Hosting points of the certificate tree.
The snap-in can be hidden in the console. To add it, run the mmc command in Start menu > Run and in the window that appears, add the Certificates snap-in to the list available on the local machine:
6.1.4 How to Export It
To export a private key for backup purposes or to configure a new server, follow these steps:
1. Find the certificate in the Certificates snap-in of the management console, and right-click on it. In the context menu that appears, click on the menu item All Tasks > Export;
2. In the Welcome to the Certificate Export wizardwindow of the Certificate Export Wizard, click Next and then in the Export Private Key window, set the switch to Yes, export the private key, and then click Next;
3. In the Export File Format window of the wizard, select the type item Personal Information Exchange – PKCS #12 (.PFX) and select the checkbox Include all certificates in the certification path if possible. Then click Next. Be aware that if the Delete the private key if the export is successful checkbox is checked, the private key created on the current server will be deleted after export;
4. In the Security wizard window, fill the Password checkbox and enter the password twice to protect the private key. It will be required for the subsequent import. Additionally, it is recommended that Active Directory users or groups that have the ability to use a private key are restricted. To do this, fill the Group or User Name checkbox and select Required Groups or Users, then click Next;
5. In the File to Export window of the wizard, specify the path to the exported file with the private key and its name. To do this, enter it manually or use the system file search dialog box, then click Next;
6. In the File to Export window of the wizard, specify the path to the exported file with the private key and its name. To do this, enter it manually or use the system file search dialog box, and then click Next. In the next window Completing the Certificate Export Wizard, a list of the installed settings will appear. Click Finish. The exported file will appear in the specified directory.
6.1.5 How to Configure SSL on IIS
To configure SSL in IIS, follow these steps:
1. Run IIS from the iis.msc command line or from the visual interface.
2. Select your server from the Connections list and click on the Bindings... link in the Actions block.
3. In the Site Bindings window, click Add.
4. In the Add Site Bindings window, fill in the following fields and click OK.
IP address – select the IP addresses of the servers with which the certificate will be associated from the drop-down list or click the All Unassigned button to associate the certificate with all servers.
Port – leave the value 443. This is a standard SSL port.
SSL certificate – select the required SSL certificate from the drop-down list.
The setup is finished, you can check the operation of the web service. If the private key is missing, then import it in the Certificates snap-in of the Management console. To do this, select the desired resource and right-click on it. Then, in the context menu that appears, click on the menu item All Tasks > Import, and follow the instructions of the wizard.
6.2 Usage on Linux
6.2.1 How to Create a Private Key
The private key that has been created can be obtained in the interface of the SSL certificate provider after sending the CSR or using specialized software, such as OpenSSL, for example.
Below is a fragment of private key generation in the web interface of the SSL certificate provider.
If the private key was created in the web interface, then the export is carried out by clicking the button there. After clicking on the button, the browser starts downloading the archive with the key file in the desired format.
To create a private RSA key using OpenSSL, one command is enough:
openssl genrsa -out rsaprivkey.pem 2048
This command generates the PEM private key and stores it in the rsaprivkey.pem file. In our example, a 2048-bit key is created, which is suitable for almost all situations.
To create a DSA key, you need to perform two steps:
The first step creates a DSA parameters file (dsaparam.pem), which in this case contains instructions for OpenSSL to create a 2048-bit key in step 2. The dsaparam.pem file is not a key, so it can be deleted after the public and private keys are created. In the second step, a private key is generated (dsaprivkey.pem file), which must be kept secret.
To create a file in the PKCS#12 format used in Windows OS, use the following command:
export – the operation of exporting the private key to the required format;
out – the directory in the file system where the resulting file should be placed;
inkey – private key file in PEM format;
in – file of the certificate received from the Certifying Center;
certfile is a copy of the root certificate and intermediate certificates in the chain. In the example above, they are missing.
6.2.2 How to Generate a CSR Request
To generate a CSR, fill in the suggested fields in the web form of the SSL certificate service provider. The figure above demonstrates an example of this. The set of minimum required fields is the same and is given in the section about CSR description, but some vendors can add their own or change the input method.
To generate CSR using OpenSSL, use the following command:
new – creating a new CSR request by direct input in the console. Without this option, the OpenSSL configuration file data will be used;
key – the name of the private key required for generation. If the option is not specified, a new private key will be created according to the default algorithm;
out – the path to the CSR file being created;
sha256 is an encryption algorithm.
After executing the command, a request to fill in the required fields will appear in the console.
Then send the resulting CSR to the Certifying Center. In response, a personal certificate must be returned.
6.2.3 How to Configure SSL for Apache
Follow these steps to configure SSL in Apache:
1. Add the personal certificate issued by the Certification Authority, the private key, and the root certificate to the /etc/ssl/ directory — along with the rest of the certificates in the chain.
2. Open the Apache configuration file with any text editor: vim, for example. Depending on the server OS, the file may be located in one of the following locations:
for CentOS: /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf;
for Debian/Ubuntu: /etc/apache2/apache2.conf;
3. If you are installing an SSL certificate on an OpenServer, use the path to its root folder. At the end of the file, create a copy of the "VirtualHost" block. Specify port 443 for the block and add the following lines inside:
SSLEngine on
SSLCertificateFile /etc/ssl/domain_name.crt
SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/ssl/private.key
SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/ssl/chain.crt
4. Check the Apache configuration before restarting with the command: apachectl configtest, then restart Apache.
6.2.4 How to configure SSL for Nginx
Follow these steps to configure SSL in Nginx:
1. Open a text editor and add the contents of the personal certificate issued by the Certification Authority, and the root certificate — along with the rest of the certificates in the chain. The resulting file should look like this:
2. Save the resulting file with the *.crt extension to the /etc/ssl/ directory. Please note: the second certificate should come directly after the first, without any empty lines.
3. Save the your_domain file.key with the certificate's private key in the /etc/ssl directory.
4. Open the Nginx configuration file and edit the virtual host of your site that you want to protect with a certificate. Perform the minimum setup for the job by adding the following lines to the file:
/etc/ssl/your_domain.crt — the path to the file created with three certificates;
/etc/ssl/your_domain.key — the path to the file with the private key.
The names of files and directories can be arbitrary.
Additionally, you can configure the operation of the site over HTTP, the type of server cache, the cache update timeout, and the operating time of a single keepalive connection. You can also configure the supported protocols and their level of priority (server set or client set), as well as OCSP responses for certificate validation. Details are given in the Nginx user manual.
5. For the changes to take effect, restart the Nginx server with the following command:
sudo /etc/init.d/nginx restart
7. Self-Signed Certificates
7.1 Usage on Windows Server and IIS
7.1.1 How to Create a Private Key
You can create a private key with IIS by creating a CSR and then actioning the above instructions.
7.1.2 How to Create a Self-Signed Root Certificate
To generate a self-signed root certificate in IIS 10, perform the following operations:
1. Run IIS from the iis.msc command line or from the visual interface.
2. Select your server from the Connections list and click on the Server Certificates button.
3. On the Server Certificates page, click the Create Domain Certificate link in the Actions block.
4. In the Distinguished Name Properties window of the Create Certificate wizard, fill in the Common Name field (the server name specified in the browser), the remaining fields that were filled when creating the CSR, and click Next.
5. In the Online Certification Authority window of the wizard, specify in the Specify Online Certification Authority field the repository where you want to place the root certificate. In the Friendly Name field, specify the name of the certificate, and then click Finish.
7.1.3 How to Create an SSL Certificate Signed by the Root
To generate a self-signed SSL certificate in IIS 10, perform the following operations:
1. Run IIS from the iis.msc command line or from the visual interface.
2. Select your server from the Connections list and click on the Server Certificates button.
3. On the Server Certificates page, click the Create Self-Signed Certificate link in the Actions block.
4. In the ‘Create Self-Signed Certificate’ window in the ‘Friendly Name’ field, specify the name of the certificate in the ‘Select a Certificate Store for the New Certificate’ field. Then, select the repository in which the self-signed certificate will be stored, and click OK.
7.1.4 How to Configure IIS for a Self-Signed Certificate
IIS configuration for Configuring IIS for a self-signed certificate requires the same process as a certificate issued by a Certification Authority.
7.2 Usage on Linux
7.2.1 How to Create a Private Key
Creating a private key using the genrsa command and other similar ones in OpenSSL is described above.
7.2.2. How to Create a Self-Signed Root Certificate
To generate a self-signed root certificate in OpenSSL, run the following command:
7.2.4. How to Configure Apache for a Self-Signed Certificate
Apache configuration for a self-signed certificate is performed in the same way as for a certificate issued by a Certification Authority.
7.2.5. How to Configure Nginx for a Self-Signed Certificate
Nginx configuration for a self-signed certificate requires the same process as a certificate issued by a Certification Authority.
7.3 How to Make Self-Signed Certificates Trusted
7.3.1 On Windows
To make a self-signed certificate trusted, follow these steps:
1. Find the repository of trusted certificates in the Certificates snap-in of the management console. Right-click on it, and then in the Context Menu that appears, click on the menu item All Tasks > Import;
2. In the Welcome to the Certificate Import wizard window of the Certificate Import wizard, click Next. Then, in the File to Import window, specify the path to the imported file with the self-signed certificate. To do this, either enter it manually or use the system file search dialog box. Afterwards, click Next.
3. In the Private Key Protection window of the wizard, enter the password specified when creating the self-signed certificate. Set the checkboxes Mark this key as exportable to allow further export of the certificate for backup purposes, and Include all extended properties, then click Next. Further export will only work if the private key is available.
4. In the Certificate Store window of the wizard, turn on Place all certificates in the following store, select the Trusted Root Certification Authorities repository, and then click Next. In the next window Completing the Certificate Import Wizard, you will see a list of the installed settings. Click Finish. The imported file will appear in the specified repository.
7.3.2 On macOS
To add a self-signed certificate to trusted certificates, follow these steps:
1. Open the Keychain Access application by clicking on the icon below and go to the All Items menu item.
2. Use Finder to find the self-signed certificate file (*.pem, *.p12 or other).
3. Drag the file to the left side of the Keychain Access window.
4. Go to the Certificates menu item, find the self-signed certificate that has been added and double-click on it.
5. Click on the Trust button in the drop-down menu and set the When using this certificate field from System Defaults to Always Trust.
7.3.3 On Linux
To add a self-signed certificate to trusted ones in Linux OS (Ubuntu, Debian), follow these steps:
1. Copy the root self-signed certificate file to the /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/ directory. To do this, run the command sudo cp foo.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/foo.crt, where foo.crt is the personal certificate file.
2. Run the sudo update-ca-certificates command.
To add a self-signed certificate to trusted certificates in Linux OS (CentOS 6), follow these steps:
1. Install the root certificates using the command: yum install ca-certificates.
2. Enable the dynamic configuration mode of root certificates: update-ca-trust force-enable.
3. Add the certificate file to the directory /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/: cp foo.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/.
4. Run the command: update-ca-trust extract.
7.3.4 On iOS
To add a self-signed certificate to trusted certificates, follow these steps:
1. Install any web server and place the certificate file in the root of the application directory.
2. Go to the URL of the web server, after which the file will be downloaded to the profile of the current user.
3. Open the Profiles menu and click Install.
4. Go to Settings > General > About-> Certificate Trust Settings and set the switch for the certificate to Enabled.
7.3.5 On Android
To make a self-signed certificate trusted, follow these steps:
1. Download the file to the device.
2. Go to Settings > Security > Credential Storage and tap Install from Device Storage.
3. Find the *.crt that has been downloaded and enter its name in the Certificate Name field. After it has been imported, the certificate will be displayed in Settings > Security > Credential Storage > Trusted Credentials > User.
7.3.6 How to Make a Root Certificate Trusted in Windows AD Group Policies
To make a root certificate trusted in Windows Active Directory Group Policies, follow these steps:
1. Run the Group management snap-in from the gpmc.msc command line.
2. Select the desired domain, right-click on it, and select Create a GPO in this domain and link it here.
3. Specify the name of the group policy in the window that appears and click OK.
4. Right-click on the created group policy and click Edit.... On the next screen, go to Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Update. Select Allow signed content from intranet Microsoft update service location and click Edit Policy Settings.
5. Set the switch to Enabled and click OK.
6. Go to Computer Configuration>Windows Settings >Security Settings>Public Key Policies and trust the required certificate in accordance with the instructions above.
7. Repeat step 4 and close the Group Policy Editor. The policy will be applied shortly. To apply it immediately, run gpupdate /force on the command line.
8. Let’s Encrypt
8.1 Usage on Windows Server and IIS
8.1.1 How to Issue a Certificate
To install the Let's Encrypt certificate, an ACME client must be installed on the server. The following implementations are common for Windows:
The Windows ACME Simple Utility (WACS) is a command–line utility for interactively issuing a certificate and binding it to a specific site on your IIS web server;
The ACMESharp Powershell module is a Powershell library. It has many commands for interacting with Let's Encrypt servers via the ACME API;
Certify is a graphical SSL certificate manager for Windows that allows you to interactively manage certificates via the ACME API.
To issue a Let's Encrypt certificate using WACS, follow these steps:
2. Open a command prompt and run the client wacs.exe from the specified location.
3. Press the N key. This will create a certificate for IIS.
4. Select the certificate type: DV for one domain, DV for all domains in IIS (SAN), domains corresponding to Wildcard, or a manual list of domains in IIS.
5. Depending on the choice, WACS.exe will display a list of sites running on the IIS server and will prompt you to select the desired site.
6. After selecting the site, provide an email address to receive information about problems including site certificate updates (several addresses can be given if they are separated by commas).
7. Agree to the terms of use by pressing the Y key, after which Windows ACME Simple will connect to Let's Encrypt servers and try to automatically generate a new SSL certificate for the site 3.
8.1.2 How to Configure IIS for Let's Encrypt Certificate
The WACS utility saves the certificate's private key (*.pem), the certificate itself, and a number of other files to the directory C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\letsencrypt-win-simple . It will then install the generated Let's Encrypt SSL certificate in the background and bind it to your IIS site.
To install the Let's Encrypt certificate, the ACME client must be installed on the server. For Linux, this is the Certbot utility.
To issue a Let's Encrypt certificate using Certbot, follow these steps:
1. Install Certbot according to the instructions on the website https://certbot.eff.org / to the server. 2. Execute the certificate issue command: certbot --nginx or certbot --apache. When launching for the first time, an email address for receiving information about problems site certificate updates and other alerts may be required.
Certbot will analyze the ServerName directive that corresponds to the domain name with the requested certificate in the web server’s configuration files. If you need to specify multiple domains or wildcard, use the command line key -d.
8.2.2 How to Configure IIS for a Let's Encrypt Certificate
After executing the certbot command, the web server configuration will be updated automatically. The certbot client will display a successful completion message, and will also show the path to the directory where the certificates are stored.
9. Certificate Renewal for Linux and Windows
9.1 Paid Trusted
When extending the validity of the SSL/TLS certificate, creating a new CSR request is recommended. Generating a new request will create a new unique key pair (public/private) for the updated certificate.
The web interface of many SSL certificate providers allows you to renew the certificate manually or automatically. After renewing, the user will receive a new reissued certificate. This needs to be reconfigured again in accordance with the instructions above.
9.2 Self-Signed
Self-signed certificates are renewed by recreating and configuring the web server in accordance with the instructions described above.
9.3 Let’s Encrypt
9.3.1 On Windows
Windows ACME Simple creates a new rule in the Windows Task Scheduler (called win-acme-renew) to automatically renew the certificate. The task is started every day, and the certificate renewal itself is performed after 60 days. When extending, the scheduler runs the command:
C:\\<path to the WACS directory>\\wacs.exe --renew --baseuri "<https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org >"
You can use the same command to manually update the certificate.
9.3.2 On Linux
To renew the certificate via certbot, you need to run the following command:
certbot Renew --force-Renewal
To specify a specific domain, use the -d parameter.
10. Testing
10.1 Services (SSL Checkers) that Allow You to Check SSL Tinctures on a Public Server
SSL verification is carried out using online services provided by Certification Centers, as well as third-party developers such as:
These services allow you to gain information about certificates, domains, organizations, cities, serial numbers, algorithms used, their parameters (such as key length) and details about the certificate chain.
10.2 Verification of the Entire Certificate Chain
The entire certificate chain is verified by SSL Shopper, Symantec SSL Toolbox and SSL Checker. The links are given above.
10.3 Checking on iOS (via a Special App)
To check certificates on iOS devices, install the SSL Checker app from the App Store. With this application, you can check the current status and validity of the SSL certificate of any server, including self-signed certificates. The application can detect changes in the certificate parameters and send notifications about it.
10.4 Checking on Android
To check certificates on Android devices, install the SSL Certificate Checker application from Google Play. Using this application, you can check the current status and attributes of the SSL certificate of any server, including the certificate chain.
Nearly 20 years ago, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) established guidelines for secure passwords. Indeed, they are still used by many websites, portals, and other services. You’re likely familiar with these password requirements — there ought to be at least 8 characters, both capital and lowercase letters, digits, and special characters. Despite these guidelines, passwords that meet these requirements are no longer safe from modern attackers. The only thing any of us can do to improve the security of our accounts is to make sure that our passwords are lengthy, complicated, and unique for each account. Due to the strict password management requirements, this strategy is, nevertheless, laborious and intimidating for many.
The same password rules do not apply today
In the modern day, password-based security is no longer seen as sufficient. Our digital world is continuously expanding, thus it is more important than ever to make sure that our data is safeguarded from cybercriminals. Cybercriminals perceive an opportunity to target people in a more sophisticated way as a result of the increasing usage of internet services. One explanation is that, although we benefit from technological improvement for our personal, social, or economic growth, cybercriminals have also benefited from the advantages of improved computer graphics cards and machine learning to enhance their attack strategies. In addition to the problem of more sophisticated cyberattacks, there are two interrelated problems with conventional password rules:
The first concern lies in our human nature — keeping track of passwords is tough
You may take a few steps as an individual to increase the security of your passwords. Start by lengthening and making your passwords more complicated. Second, create a unique password for each website you visit. The difficulty of remembering a password increases with its complexity. As a result, we frequently select passwords that are not entirely suitable yet are simple to remember. The difficulty of managing several complicated passwords for every online account leads to the frequent reuse of the same passwords across multiple platforms. As a result, a successful attacker immediately wins big.
However, the high level of password complexity necessary to maintain online safety should not be blamed; rather, it should be pointed out that we can’t improve our inadequate password management skills. Using a password manager to generate and store secure passwords is a useful solution. It is not humanly possible to manage strong passwords for all of our internet accounts without assistance, such as password managers. Because they can't recall the complicated, random sequences of letters, numbers, and special characters, the problem increases the likelihood that individuals will write down their passwords. Passwords are left exposed in digital files stored on a computer or in desk-top notes, making it simple for hackers to hack and read passwords.
The second problem is that passwords have a mathematical limit
There are only ever a finite amount of potential password combinations since a password is a mix of letters, numbers, and symbols. As a result, the best technique for breaking passwords is brute force attacks. Until the correct combination is identified and the password is broken, brute force attacks attempt all possible combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols. Theoretically, a stronger password would be one that is harder to guess due to its length, complexity, and number of possible permutations. However, attackers are now substantially more frequently exploiting Graphic Processing Units (GPUs) to break passwords. GPUs are a component of a computer's graphics card and were first designed to speed up the loading of images and movies. They now show promise for computing hashes (the method used in brute force attacks).
According to studies on password cracking times, passwords may be cracked much more quickly using sophisticated computer graphics cards. Using the most recent computer graphic cards, an 8-character password that used to take 8 hours to crack in 2018 now only takes 39 minutes (see the conclusive 2022 results in the table below). Passwords are gradually getting simpler to crack as a result of recent technical developments, which is a concerning trend. More crucial, however, is the fact that if a password has already been stolen, repeated across sites, or contains basic phrases, attackers may access your accounts right away, regardless of the complexity of the password or the attacker's graphics card.
Consider a 4-character password made up of all 26 letters in the Latin alphabet (case-insensitive) in order to visualize this mathematical example.
26^4 = 456,976 possible password combinations
The number of viable choices rises to when you include digits, uppercase and lowercase letters, and special characters.
95^4 = 81,450,625 possible password combinations
However, because the password must contain at least one special character, one number, one capital letter, and one lowercase letter, the quantity drops to
5,353,920 possible password combinations.
Nevertheless, assuming there are no password-entry security measures, this can be cracked in less than a second by a computer (such as automatic account blocking).
Increase the length and complexity of passwords
Longer or more complicated password phrases are strongly advised when creating new passwords. In this manner, potential attackers will have a harder time breaking the codes. It's crucial to take into account the popularity of the selected password combination in addition to the amount of alternative password combinations. For instance, lists of frequently used passwords or phrases, such as "qwerty," "password," or "12345," are frequently used in brute force assaults.
Therefore, the password should be completely unique or not contain any words at all. For instance, one technique would be to employ acronyms or mnemonics, such as generating a password out of the first few characters of a long text. As an illustration, consider making the password ‘Ilts@7S!’ out of the words I love to ski at Seven Springs.
Password length and complexity alone are insufficient
We are aware that adding length and complexity to passwords is the only method to increase their strength and, consequently, the safety of our accounts. The time it typically takes an attacker to break a password in 2022 using a powerful commercial computer is displayed below. This chart, which has been analysed and periodically updated since 2018, shows how quickly passwords can be broken on current machines. This pattern indicates that, despite our best efforts to create passwords that are longer and more complicated, passwords alone are no longer sufficient to meet the required internet security standards.
In conclusion, password rules increase the complexity of passwords without necessarily enhancing their security.
Whenever the word ‘cybersecurity’ appears, the word ‘password’ springs to mind in parallel. People use them everywhere, from mobile phone locks to the protection of personal and state data stored on individual devices or websites. Everyone knows that a strong and secure password is able to save our sensitive information, however, cybercriminals have invented a huge variety of methods to hack our passwords in order to compromise us. So, modern problems require modern solutions. Now, there are a lot of alternative ways to protect access to personal data. The usual passwords are replaced by multi-layer authentication or just more progressive technologies. These are fingerprints and face recognition functions, keychains, and password vaults. But what is the future of passwords? Will they become an outdated option or stay a necessary part of access.
Why are passwords considered weak?
With the growth of cybercrime, the requirements for passwords are increasing. The first passwords consisted of short, easily-memorized word or numeral combinations, but they were too easy to crack. Now, passwords are sophisticated alpha-numeral combinations, sometimes too long to remember. Nevertheless, it is still possible for hackers to find the solution and get access to your account. Passwords are usually based on some common information like a date of birth, the name of a child, or a home pet, which implies that hackers are able to find out what it is if they have enough time. The other reason why passwords become targets is the fact that they provide unrestricted access to your account. Moreover, many people use the same or similar passwords for many different accounts, so they simplify the process of collecting their sensitive data from multiple sources. Of course, using the same password for every account mitigates the risk of forgetting the password, but reusing the combination is quite risky. Users are sure that they won’t be hacked as the data they store is not valuable enough to be stolen, but it’s a common mistake as almost everyone can be compromised or fall victim to a bot attack that is aimed at spreading spam or malicious links. So, the best way to protect your privacy is not to reuse the same password and exploit multi-layer authentication for your accounts.
The anti-password movement
This movement was established as soon as people understood that usual passwords are more vulnerable than they should be. Passwords are inconvenient and provide multiple avenues for fraudsters to obtain your data and profit from it. The most typical method for hackers to profit from this data is to sell it on the dark web for fast cash. Advanced attacks on logins have been known to shut down entire corporations or launch ransomware campaigns. Credential stuffing is the most well-known form of password hacking, it is based on the reusing of the same password for multiple accounts, pairing it with different email addresses or logins. It is usually aimed at taking over as much information from corporate accounts as possible. Thus, internet users realized that passwords are not the most powerful protection that can be exploited for security goals. So, what was made in addition to, or in place of, the password?
Multi-factor authentication
Single-factor authentication refers to the requirement of only one password to access an account. This method of protection has been used for a long time, but now it’s obsolete. The new practice in authentication is multi-factor access which requires passing two or more layers of authentication before accessing an account. The possible steps of this sophisticated technology could be the PIN code, the server-generated one-time code sent to your email address or mobile phone, or even fingerprints and face recognition.
It makes access more complicated but also serves as an additional barrier to compromise attempts and data thieves. This motivates them to move on to more straightforward targets. While it isn't infallible, it does dissuade attackers from trying anything else, potentially rescuing you from disaster.
Another successful way of protection is the passphrase that is used instead of common password combinations. It is represented as the meaningful or meaningless word combination consisting of up to 100 words. It seems to be hard to remember a long phrase, but it is much easier than remembering alpha-numeric combinations including substitution, capitalization, and different numbers. Hackers will find it incredibly difficult to break into a system since passwords are several words long and can contain an endless number of word combinations. Another good thing about such protection is the lack of necessity to install the special apps or systems required to use this technique. It can be applied to every account without special password character limits.
Is the password dead?
The first hacking attacks were conducted as early as the 80s. Regardless of this, people still use passwords as the main protection force for their private information. So, why can’t we replace it with more modern and convenient technologies?
First of all, it’s related to the ease of creating passwords. The password is generated by the user himself, so there’s no need to create and exploit special services that would be able to provide protection for the account on the user’s behalf. Another point is the privacy of users. The password is one of the more private ways of authentication as it doesn’t require any personal information, it can be a random combination of numbers and lack sense, unlike methods such as biomedical data access, which is connected with personal information that could get out into cyberspace. The last but not the least important point lies in the simplicity of replacing passwords. It can be useful in the event of a major data breach, as it’s easier to change the password than the biomedical options that are used for fingerprints or face recognition.
Conclusion
So what will be the future of passwords? Passwords will definitely be used as one layer of a multi-factor security system for the next few years as there are still no more useful options for saving our privacy than passwords. People are continuing to look for the perfect method of protection, so maybe in a few years, something will finally appear and the world will be able to say goodbye to long sophisticated passwords. Some services have already turned to new systems of access, like one-time codes or fingerprints, but there is still a possibility of being hacked. Indeed, users still believe that a multi-layer system of protection is more convenient than any possible alternative.
Are you sure that your home is protected in the way that you think? Sure, you can secure it with modern locks or an alarm system to protect yourself from robbers who want to steal your money or furniture, but what about those who are looking at your home as a means of stealing your privacy?
As the number of smart electronic devices we use every day increases, we have to make sure that the personal information that is recorded by these devices is safe.
So let’s talk about home security and how to protect yourself from those that are looking for ways to hack your smart devices.
Which smart devices can be hacked?
Almost every smart system used with modern devices is potentially dangerous as hackers know hundreds of ways to obtain remote access to them. But still, some devices seem too ordinary and primitive to be hacked. Perhaps a robot vacuum cleaner or a smart baby monitor. But there are more sophisticated technologies like a smart TV or smart house security system. They're all vulnerable since they're connected to the internet and are frequently part of your home Wi-Fi network. Recent research showed that every one of them has several serious security flaws.
What are the risks?
Many experts note that when it comes to smart home devices, you should be thinking about ‘when’ they will be hacked, not 'if,' because many are notoriously easy to hack and provide no protection whatsoever. Scientists from the European watchdog Eurovomsumers examined 16 regularly used devices from a variety of manufacturers and discovered 54 vulnerabilities that exposed consumers to hacker attacks, with potential implications ranging from security system deactivation to personal data theft.
According to the results of research, hackers can gain access to highly sensitive information such as banking credentials or even utilise many linked devices to stage enormous distributed denial of service (DDOS) operations, which allows them to ruin banking or other service networks.
Whenever most internet users realise the vulnerabilities associated with the usage of computers connected to the Internet, many people still do not pay enough attention to the fact that their home smart devices also present the same danger. As all home devices are commonly connected to the same Wi-Fi network, it gives an opportunity for hackers to get access to all domestic technologies at the same time.
Security gaps
One of the most significant dangers that are presented by smart home devices is the potential for a ‘deauthentication attack’, in which a hacker orders the device to disconnect from the house Wi-Fi. It may cause the blocking of systems and devices, which won’t be able to respond to users’ requests as a result. It was also discovered that some apps designed for home appliances are able to transfer unencrypted data. It means that if hackers break into their system, they’ll gain access to the owner's personal information, such as Wi-Fi passwords or even listen to what happens around the device if it’s equipped with a microphone. A stolen WiFi password may provide hackers access to phones or computers connected to this network and lead to an eventual data leak.
Due to the gaps in security systems, smart devices often have flaws that make them vulnerable to attack. Designers of these devices focus on the comfort of exploitation and multifunctionality of their products, but not on their security. But now, when almost everything from house alarms to refrigerators can be hacked, it becomes a paramount point.
Recent research that took place in America and Europe has shown that about a half of interviewees use smart home devices, but most of them do nothing to protect themselves from being compromised. Thus, even though people know about the risks, they still do nothing to minimize them. One of the possible reasons for such behavior is the lack of knowledge and accessible information about how to make the usage of smart home devices secure.
How can you secure your home devices?
Of course, the most basic way to protect yourself from the hacking of your smart home devices is just not to use them and replace them with less functional but safer options. But what if you can’t go without such a pleasure? Well, Euroconsumers — one of the most well-known private organizations for consumers — developed a list of recommendations that can help people who want to maintain their privacy while using smart devices:
1. Use an ethernet cable instead of Wi-Fi to connect your devices to the network where possible;
2. Create strong multilayered passwords for your devices and Wi-Fi;
3. After installing your Wi-Fi network, always change the default name;
4. Always keep your devices up-to-date and switch them off if you’re not using them at a certain moment;
5. When you use a device for the first time, always finish the setup procedure;
6. Do not buy cheap devices with a low level of protection.
Conclusion
When we’re talking about smart devices, we’re not just talking about full smart house systems such as alarms. Rather, we’re talking about smart appliances such as TVs, doorbell systems, vacuum cleaners, and other common household things. Using them makes our lives more comfortable and saves time and energy. However, they each have their own flaws, and many are vulnerable when it comes to hacking. So, consumers should pay attention to this point of using smart devices and consider all possible ways to protect their privacy without refusing to exploit such useful appliances. If you use one of these devices, try to get more information regarding what manufacturers pay more attention to regarding the security of their goods. Moreover, make sure to protect your own devices from hacking. It won’t take a lot of time or effort, but it will save your sensitive data and protect you from being compromised.
Which words pop into your head when creating a password for your new account on a website or on a social network? Safety? Privacy? Well, there’s some bad news — hackers are clued-up on hacking any kind of password that you can think into existence, and as a matter of fact, it’s a global problem.
According to recent Kaspersky analysis of 193 million real-world passwords, 59% can be cracked in under one hour using a modern GPU and smart guessing algorithms. Even more alarming, 45% of those passwords fall in under one minute. This data underscores a harsh reality for enterprise security teams: traditional password complexity rules are failing.
Attackers no longer rely solely on manual guessing. They deploy industrialized, AI-assisted tools and Malware-as-a-Service platforms to harvest credentials at an unprecedented scale. The leak of 16 billion credentials from 30 data sources and the exposure of 184 million credentials on underground markets demonstrate the sheer volume of data available to threat actors.
This article explains how each major password cracking technique works, the real-world scale of these threats, and what organizations must do to defend against them. Understanding the attacker’s toolkit is the first step in securing your enterprise infrastructure.
What is password cracking?
Password cracking is the process by which attackers attempt to recover or bypass authentication credentials — either by decrypting stolen password hashes offline or by guessing credentials directly against live systems. Techniques range from automated brute-force and dictionary attacks to AI-powered guessing, phishing, and infostealer malware.
Security professionals divide these techniques into two primary categories: online and offline attacks:
Online attacks involve interacting directly with a live authentication system, such as a website login portal or an SSH gateway. These attacks are inherently constrained by network latency, rate-limiting, and account lockout policies.
Offline attacks pose a far greater enterprise threat. When attackers steal a database of hashed passwords, they can attempt to crack them on their own hardware without triggering any network alarms. Unconstrained by rate limits, attackers leverage immense computational power. A single modern GPU, such as an NVIDIA RTX 4090, can process 164 billion MD5 hashes per second. Against this level of hardware, weak passwords are mathematically trivial to break.
Top 12 Password cracking techniques hackers use in 2025
1. Brute force attack
A brute force attack relies on exhaustive enumeration. The attacker’s software systematically tries every possible combination of characters — letters, numbers, and symbols — until it finds the correct match. It is the most fundamental password cracking technique, guaranteeing success eventually, provided the attacker has enough time and computing power.
The scale of brute force attacks has expanded massively due to cloud computing. Attackers can rent massive GPU clusters for a few dollars per hour, bringing supercomputer-level cracking capabilities to anyone.
To defend against brute force attacks, organizations must enforce minimum length requirements of at least 12 characters. Length provides exponentially more protection than complexity. Implement strict account lockout policies for online portals to stop live guessing.
For stored data, ensure all passwords are hashed using computationally expensive algorithms like bcrypt or Argon2, which intentionally slow down the verification process and neutralize hardware advantages.
2. Dictionary attack
A dictionary attack uses a precompiled list of likely passwords to guess credentials. Attackers leverage massive wordlists, such as the infamous RockYou dataset, Have I Been Pwned dumps, and custom lists derived from Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT). They combine these base words with rule-based mutations, adding common numbers, capitalization, and “leet speak” substitutions (e.g., replacing “a” with “@”).
This method is highly efficient because we are predictable. We favor memorable words and patterns. Kaspersky’s analysis revealed that 57% of all analyzed passwords contain a dictionary word or a common symbol combination. Instead of trying every possible character, a dictionary attack tests the passwords people actually use, drastically reducing the time required to breach an account.
Defense requires blocking common passwords at the point of creation. Integrate a breached password monitoring service into your Active Directory or identity provider to prevent users from selecting known compromised terms. Enforce true randomness in password generation, moving away from simple substitutions that dictionary rules easily anticipate.
3. Credential stuffing
Credential stuffing exploits the human habit of password reuse. Attackers take massive lists of usernames and passwords exposed in one breach and systematically test them across hundreds of other services using automated botnets. If a user utilizes the same password for their personal email and their corporate VPN, a breach of the former immediately compromises the latter.
The 2025 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) highlights the dominance of this technique. Compromised credentials served as the initial access vector in 22% of all confirmed breaches. Credential stuffing accounted for a median 19% of all daily authentication attempts across monitored networks, spiking to an overwhelming 44% on the worst days. The 2023 breach of 23andMe stands as a canonical example of how devastating this attack vector can be when users recycle credentials.
Defending against credential stuffing requires eliminating password reuse entirely. The only reliable way to prevent credential stuffing is to use unique, complex passwords for every corporate service.
Since employees cannot memorize dozens of unique credentials, companies must implement an enterprise password manager like Passwork. It automatically generates and securely stores unique credentials, eliminating the practice of password reuse. Deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across all external-facing portals. Security teams must monitor authentication logs for anomalous login patterns.
4. Password spraying
Password spraying is the inverse of a traditional brute force attack. Instead of trying thousands of passwords against a single account, an attacker tries one highly probable password — such as "“Password1!” or “Welcome2025” — against thousands of different accounts. This “low and slow” approach is specifically designed to evade account lockout policies and intrusion detection systems.
This technique remains highly effective against large organizations. SSH.com notes that Single Sign-On (SSO) environments are particularly vulnerable, as one successful guess grants access to a wide array of corporate resources. Attackers often time their spraying campaigns to coincide with corporate events, seasonal changes, or new employee onboarding, using passwords relevant to the context.
To stop password spraying, organizations must block commonly sprayed passwords globally. Implement MFA to ensure that a guessed password alone is insufficient for access. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems should be configured to monitor for distributed, low-frequency login failures across the network, which often indicate an ongoing spray attack.
5. Rainbow table attack
A rainbow table attack uses massive, precomputed tables of hash-to-plaintext pairings to reverse cryptographic hashes instantly. Instead of calculating hashes on the fly, the attacker simply looks up the stolen hash in their database to find the corresponding password. This technique is devastatingly effective against older, unsalted hashing algorithms like LM, NTLM, and MD5.
The effectiveness of rainbow tables relies entirely on the absence of a cryptographic “salt” — a random string of data added to the password before hashing. If two users have the same password, an unsalted hash will look identical for both. A rainbow table exploits this predictability. Defending against rainbow tables is straightforward: ensure all password storage uses salted hashing. When a unique salt is added to every password, the precomputed tables become useless.
6. Phishing and spear phishing
The easiest and most common way of hacking someone’s password is phishing. There are plenty of techniques here: phishing can take the form of an email, an SMS, a direct message on a social media platform, or a public post on a website.
Phishing bypasses the technical challenge of cracking a password by simply tricking the user into handing it over. Attackers deploy fake login pages, deceptive email lures, and sophisticated Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) proxy attacks. AiTM attacks are particularly dangerous because they sit between the user and the legitimate service, capturing session cookies and MFA tokens in real time.
Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) is a type of cyberattack where an attacker secretly intercepts and relays communication between a user and a legitimate service in real time.
Phishing takes many forms. Spear phishing targets specific individuals with highly personalized lures. Smishing uses SMS messages, vishing relies on voice calls, and whaling targets C-suite executives. The IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025 identified phishing as the most common initial attack vector, responsible for 16% of breaches at an average cost of $4.88 million per incident.
Defense requires a multi-layered approach. Regular security awareness training helps employees recognize deceptive tactics. Deploy strict email filtering and DMARC authentication to block malicious messages before they reach the inbox. Most importantly, organizations must transition to phishing-resistant MFA, such as FIDO2 security keys or passkeys, which mathematically bind the authentication token to the specific legitimate domain, rendering stolen credentials useless.
When an employee navigates to a login page, the Passwork browser extension analyzes the underlying URL before offering to autofill any credentials. If an attacker uses a deceptive domain — such as “micros0ft.com” instead of “microsoft.com” — that visually impersonates a legitimate corporate service, Passwork will not recognize the site and will refuse to insert the password.
7. Keylogger and infostealer malware
While traditional keyloggers simply recorded keystrokes, modern attackers utilize highly sophisticated infostealer malware. Families like Lumma, Acreed, and StealC V2 operate silently, extracting saved browser passwords, active session cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and MFA tokens in a single sweep.
The scale of this threat is staggering. According to Vectra AI and DeepStrike, infostealers stole 1.8 billion credentials from 5.8 million devices in 2025 — representing an 800% year-over-year increase. This explosion is driven by the Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. Sophisticated infostealer platforms are available on dark web forums for as little as $200 per month, lowering the barrier to entry for cybercriminals.
To defend against infostealers, organizations must deploy robust Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Implement privileged access management to restrict the execution of unauthorized software. Employees must be strictly prohibited from saving corporate credentials in built-in browser password managers. Using a dedicated, encrypted vault like Passwork isolates credentials from malicious endpoint processes and prevents mass theft by infostealers.
8. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack
A Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack occurs when an attacker intercepts communication between a user and a legitimate service. This can happen on unsecured public Wi-Fi networks, through rogue access points, or via DNS cache poisoning. The attacker captures the traffic, extracting plaintext passwords or session tokens as they travel across the network.
The modern evolution of this technique is the Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) proxy attack. Attackers use reverse proxies to seamlessly relay traffic between the victim and the real authentication server. When the user enters their password and MFA code, the proxy captures the resulting authenticated session cookie, allowing the attacker to bypass MFA entirely.
Defense relies on robust encryption and network security. Enforce HTTPS and TLS 1.3 across all internal and external communications. Require the use of corporate VPNs when employees connect from public or untrusted networks. To defeat AiTM attacks, deploy phishing-resistant FIDO2 authentication, which validates the origin of the request and prevents session token theft.
9. Social engineering
Social engineering attacks target the human layer of security. Attackers use pretexting, impersonation, and psychological manipulation to bypass technical controls. A common tactic involves calling the IT service desk, impersonating a legitimate employee, and requesting an urgent password reset.
Research from Specops Secure Service Desk highlights that helpdesk agents are frequent targets for these attacks. Attackers gather personal information from LinkedIn or other public sources to answer basic security questions, convincing the agent to hand over temporary credentials or reset an MFA device.
Defending against social engineering requires strict, verifiable protocols. Service desks must implement rigorous identity verification procedures that do not rely on easily discoverable public information. Security awareness training should extend to IT staff, focusing on the tactics used to manipulate support personnel. Implement Zero Trust access policies to limit the blast radius if an account is compromised through human error.
10. Hybrid attack
A hybrid attack combines the speed of a dictionary attack with the thoroughness of a brute force approach. Attackers take a known base word — often a company name, a season, or a previously leaked password — and append or prepend numbers, symbols, and years.
This technique is exceptionally effective against post-breach password resets. When forced to change a compromised password like “Atlanta2024!”, a user will predictably change it to “Atlanta2025!”. Attackers know this behavior and configure their cracking tools to test these incremental variations automatically.
Defense requires strict password history policies. Active Directory and identity providers must be configured to block incremental variations of previous passwords. Organizations should move away from arbitrary password expiration policies, which encourage users to create predictable, iterative passwords, and instead focus on continuous breached password monitoring.
11. Pass-the-Hash (PtH) and Kerberoasting
Pass-the-Hash (PtH) and Kerberoasting are advanced techniques specifically targeting enterprise Active Directory environments. In a PtH attack, an adversary extracts the NTLM hash of a user’s password from a compromised machine’s memory using tools like Mimikatz. They then use this hash to authenticate to other network resources without ever needing to crack the plaintext password.
Kerberoasting targets service accounts. Any authenticated domain user can request a Kerberos service ticket for a Service Principal Name (SPN). The attacker extracts this ticket and takes it offline, attempting to crack the service account’s password hash at their leisure. Because service accounts often have high privileges and rarely change their passwords, they are prime targets.
Defending against these lateral movement techniques requires strict control over privileged accounts. Adhere to the principle of least privilege. Passwork allows teams to securely manage shared administrative passwords using a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model, ensuring that critical hashes are not compromised due to careless storage. Monitor network traffic for unusual Kerberos ticket requests. Transition to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs), which automatically rotate complex passwords, eliminating the risk of offline Kerberoasting.
12. AI-powered password guessing
Artificial Intelligence has fundamentally altered the password cracking landscape. Tools like PassGAN use Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) trained on massive datasets of leaked credentials. Instead of relying on static wordlists or rigid mutation rules, these neural networks learn the underlying psychology of how humans construct passwords. They generate statistically likely candidates with terrifying accuracy.
When AI generation is combined with high-speed hashing tools like Hashcat, the overall success rate of cracking campaigns increases dramatically. AI tools complement traditional methods, filling the gaps where dictionary rules fail.
Defense against AI-powered guessing requires passwords that lack human patterns entirely. Organizations must mandate the use of password managers to generate and store passwords of 15 or more characters with true cryptographic randomness. Combine this with robust MFA and continuous breached password monitoring to mitigate the threat of AI-generated guesses.
How hackers prioritize their targets
Attackers operate with a clear economic model, prioritizing techniques based on efficiency, scale, and the value of the target. Credential stuffing and phishing are the preferred methods for mass exploitation. Because stolen credentials sell for as little as $10 on criminal markets, the return on investment for automated stuffing campaigns is exceptionally high.
When attackers acquire a database of hashed passwords, they turn to dictionary attacks and AI-powered guessing, reserving resource-intensive brute force attacks for high-value administrative accounts. Infostealer malware is deployed selectively against targets likely to yield access to corporate networks, cryptocurrency assets, or proprietary source code.
Time is always on the attacker’s side. Check Point found that organizations take an average of 94 days to remediate compromised credentials exposed in GitHub repositories. Attackers exploit this window aggressively, using automated scripts to validate and weaponize leaked secrets within minutes of exposure. Understanding this prioritization helps defenders allocate their resources effectively, focusing on the attack vectors that present the highest statistical risk.
How to protect your organization against password cracking
Securing an enterprise against modern password cracking requires a comprehensive, layered defense strategy. Technical controls must align with human behavior to create a resilient authentication environment.
Enforce strong, unique passwords Length matters more than complexity. Following NIST SP 800-63B guidance, organizations should require passwords of at least 12 characters. Because humans cannot memorize dozens of long, random strings, provide an enterprise password manager to generate and store truly random credentials for every service.
Deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) MFA is mandatory, but not all MFA is equal. Prioritize phishing-resistant authentication methods like FIDO2 security keys or passkeys. Move away from SMS-based One-Time Passwords (OTPs), which are highly vulnerable to SIM swapping and AiTM proxy attacks.
Monitor for breached credentials The Verizon 2025 DBIR notes that only 3% of passwords meet NIST complexity requirements. Organizations must continuously check employee passwords against known breach databases. If a credential appears in a public dump, the system should force an immediate reset.
Implement privileged access management Protect service accounts and shared credentials, which are the primary targets for lateral movement attacks like Pass-the-Hash and Kerberoasting. Restrict administrative access and log all privileged sessions.
Conduct security awareness training Social engineering and phishing remain the most common initial access vectors. Regular, contextual training and simulated phishing tests measurably reduce employee susceptibility to credential harvesting lures.
Deploy a centralized enterprise password manager Security policies work effectively when employees have convenient tools to follow them. Implementing an enterprise password manager like Passwork solves the human factor problem.
Passwork provides teams with an encrypted vault featuring granular Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), detailed audit logs, and seamless Active Directory/SSO integration. For companies with strict compliance requirements, Passwork offers an on-premise version, allowing organizations to host all encrypted data exclusively on their own servers and eliminate the risks associated with cloud breaches.
Conclusion
The threat landscape has shifted fundamentally. Password cracking has evolved from a niche technical skill into an industrialized, AI-assisted, and MaaS-enabled attack category. The 2025 data is unambiguous: stolen credentials drive the vast majority of corporate breaches, and the tools available to attackers have never been more powerful or accessible. Relying on outdated complexity rules and manual password management is a guaranteed path to compromise.
The most effective organizational response requires a holistic approach. It combines strong password hygiene, phishing-resistant MFA, continuous breach monitoring, and a centralized password management platform.
Are you ready to protect your corporate infrastructure against modern cracking techniques? Discover how Passwork helps enterprise teams securely store, generate, and manage corporate passwords with complete control over their data.
Ready to take the first step? Start your free Passwork trial to get complete control, automated credential management, and enterprise-grade data protection.
Frequently asked questions
What is the most common password cracking technique in 2025?
Credential stuffing is the most prevalent technique at scale, accounting for a median 19% of all daily authentication attempts according to the Verizon 2025 DBIR. Phishing was the most common initial breach vector, responsible for 16% of confirmed breaches, as reported in the IBM 2025 Cost of a Data Breach Report.
How long does it take to crack a password?
It depends entirely on length, complexity, and the hashing algorithm used. Kaspersky’s analysis of 193 million real-world passwords found that 59% could be cracked in under one hour using a modern GPU and smart guessing algorithms. An 8-character alphanumeric password can be cracked by an RTX 4090 in approximately 17 seconds. Passwords of 15 or more truly random characters would take centuries to crack with current hardware.
To guarantee the use of such cryptographically strong passwords without sacrificing productivity, organizations should rely on built-in password generators provided by solutions like Passwork.
What is the difference between a brute force and a dictionary attack?
A brute force attack tries every possible character combination systematically, which is thorough but slow. A dictionary attack uses a precompiled list of likely passwords, including common words, leaked credentials, and OSINT-derived terms. Dictionary attacks are far faster in practice because most real-world passwords follow predictable human patterns.
Can AI crack passwords?
Yes. AI-powered tools like PassGAN use neural networks trained on real password datasets to generate statistically likely guesses. Research shows PassGAN can crack 51% of common passwords in under one minute and 65% within one hour — significantly outperforming traditional dictionary attacks on their own.
Does multi-factor authentication prevent password cracking?
MFA significantly raises the bar, but it is not a complete defense. Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks can intercept MFA tokens in real time. Phishing-resistant FIDO2 or passkey authentication is the current gold standard for preventing credential-based attacks.
If you've heard of ‘SHA’ in various forms but aren't sure what it stands for or why it's essential — you’re in luck! We'll attempt to shed some light on the family of cryptographic hash algorithms today.
But, before we get into SHA, let's go over what a hash function is and how it works. Before you can comprehend what SHA-1 and SHA-2 are, you must first grasp these principles.
Let's get started.
What Is a hash function?
A hash function relates to a set of characters (known as a key) of a certain length. The hash value is a representation of the original string of characters, however, it is usually smaller.
Because the shorter hash value is simpler to search for than the lengthier text, hashing is used for indexing and finding things in databases. Encryption employs hashing as well.
SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-256… What’s this all about?
There are three types of secure hash algorithms: SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-256. The initial iteration of the algorithm was SHA-1, which was followed by SHA-2, an updated and better version of the first. The SHA-2 method produces a plethora of bit-length variables, which are referred to as SHA-256. Simply put, if you see “SHA-2,” “SHA-256” or “SHA-256 bit,” those names are referring to the same thing.
The NIST's Formal Acceptance
FIPS 180-4, published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, officially defines the SHA-256 standard. Moreover, a set of test vectors is included with standardization and formalization to confirm that developers have correctly implemented the method.
Let’s break down the algorithm and how it works:
1. Append padding bits
The first step in our hashing process is to add bits to our original message to make it the same length as the standard length needed for the hash function. To accomplish so, we begin by adding a few details to the message we already have. The amount of bits we add is determined so that the message's length is precisely 64 bits less than a multiple of 512 after these bits are added. This can be expressed mathematically in the following way:
n x 512 = M + P + 64
M is the original message's length. P stands for padded bits.
2. Append length bits
Now that we've added our padding bits to the original message, we can go ahead and add our length bits, which are equal to 64 bits, to make the whole message an exact multiple of 512.
We know we need to add 64 extra bits, so we'll compute them by multiplying the modulo of the original message (the one without the padding) by 232. We add those lengths to the padded bits in the message and get the complete message block, which must be a multiple of 512.
3. Initialize the buffers
We now have our message block, on which we will begin our calculations in order to determine the final hash. Before we get started, I want to point out that we'll need certain default settings to get started with the steps we'll be taking.
a = 0x6a09e667 b = 0xbb67ae85 c = 0x3c6ef372 d = 0xa54ff53a e = 0x510e527f f = 0x9b05688c g = 0x1f83d9ab h = 0x5be0cd19
Keep these principles in the back of your mind for now; all will fit together in the following phase. There are a further 64 variables to remember, which will operate as keys and are symbolized by the letter 'k.'
Let's go on to the portion where we calculate the hash using these data.
4. Compression Function
As a result, here is where the majority of the hashing algorithm is found. The whole message block, which is 'n x 512' bits long, is broken into 'n' chunks of 512 bits, each of which is then put through 64 rounds of operations, with the result being provided as input for the next round of operations.
The 64 rounds of operation conducted on a 512-bit message are plainly visible in the figure above. We can see that we send in two inputs: W(i) and K(i). During the first 16 rounds, we further break down the 512-bit message into 16 pieces, each consisting of 32 bits. Indeed, we must compute the value for W(i) at each step.
W(i) = Wⁱ⁻¹⁶ + σ⁰ + Wⁱ⁻⁷ + σ¹ where, σ⁰ = (Wⁱ⁻¹⁵ ROTR⁷(x)) XOR (Wⁱ⁻¹⁵ ROTR¹⁸(x)) XOR (Wⁱ⁻¹⁵ SHR³(x)) σ¹ = (Wⁱ⁻² ROTR¹⁷(x)) XOR (Wⁱ⁻² ROTR¹⁹(x)) XOR (Wⁱ⁻² SHR¹⁰(x)) ROTRⁿ(x) = Circular right rotation of 'x' by 'n' bits SHRⁿ(x) = Circular right shift of 'x' by 'n' bits
5. Output
Every round's output is used as an input for the next round, and so on until just the final bits of the message are left, at which point the result of the last round for the nth portion of the message block will give us the result, i.e. the hash for the whole message. The output has a length of 256 bits.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, the whole principle behind SHA would sound something like this:
We determine the length of the message to be hashed, then add a few bits to it, beginning with '1' and continuing with '0' and then ‘1’ again until the message length is precisely 64 bits less than a multiple of 512. By multiplying the modulo of the original message by 232, we may add the remaining 64 bits. The complete message block may be represented as 'n x 512' bits after the remaining bits are added. Now, we split each of these 512 bits into 16 pieces, each of 32 bits, using the compression function, which consists of 64 rounds of operations. For the first 16 rounds, these 16 sections, each of 32 bits, operate as input, and for the next 48 rounds, we have a technique to compute the W(i). We also include preset buffer settings and 'k' values for each of the 64 rounds. We can now begin computing hashes since we have all of the necessary numbers and formulae. The hashing procedure is then repeated 64 times, with the result of the i round serving as the input for the i+1 round. As a result, the output of the 64th operation of the nth round will be the output, which is the hash of the whole message.
The SHA-256 hashing algorithm is now one of the most extensively used hashing algorithms since it has yet to be cracked and the hashes are generated rapidly when compared to other safe hashes such as the SHA-512. It is well-established, but the industry is working to gradually transition to SHA-512, which is more secure, since experts believe SHA-256 may become susceptible to hacking in the near future.
If the concept of ‘quantum cryptography' sounds complicated to you, you're right. That’s why this ‘encryption tutorial for dummies’ shall demystify the concept and provide an explanation in layman’s terms.
Quantum cryptography, which has been around for a few decades, is becoming more and more important to our daily lives because of its ability to protect essential data in a manner that conventional encryption techniques cannot.
What is it?
Cryptography, as we all know, is a technique that aims to encrypt data by scrambling plain text so that only those with the appropriate ‘key’ can read it. By extension, quantum cryptography encrypts data and transmits it in an unhackable manner using the principles of quantum mechanics.
While such a concept seems straightforward, the intricacy resides in the quantum mechanics that underpin quantum cryptography. For example:
The particles that make up the cosmos are fundamentally unpredictable, and they may exist in several places or states of existence at the same time;
A quantum attribute cannot be measured without causing it to change or be disturbed;
Some quantum attributes of a particle can be cloned, but not the whole particle.
How does it work?
Theoretically, quantum cryptography operates by following a model that was first published in 1984.
Assume there are two people called Alice and Bob who want to communicate a message in a safe manner, according to the model of quantum cryptography. Alice sends Bob a key, which serves as the signal for the communication to begin. One of the most important components is a stream of photons that go in just one direction. Each photon corresponds to a single bit of data — either a 0 or a 1 — in the computer's memory. However, in addition to traveling in a straight path, these photons are oscillating, or vibrating, in a certain fashion as they move.
The photons pass via a polarizer before reaching Alice, the sender, who then commences the transmission. When some photons pass through a polarizer with the same vibrations as before, and when others pass through with different vibrations, the filter is said to be ‘polarized’. There are many polarization states to choose from, including vertical (1 bit), horizontal (0 bit), 45 degrees right (1 bit) and 45 degrees left (0 bit). In whatever system she employs, the broadcast has one of two polarizations, each encoding a single bit, which is either 0 or 1.
From the polarizer to the receiver, the photons are now traveling via optical fiber to Bob. Each photon is analyzed using a beam splitter, which determines the polarization of each photon. After receiving the photon key, Bob does not recognize the right polarization of the photons, so he chooses one polarization at random from a pool of available options. Alice now compares the polarizers Bob used to polarize the key and informs Bob of the polarizer she used to deliver each photon to the receiver. Bob checks to see whether he used the right polarizer at this point. The photons that were read with the incorrect splitter are then eliminated, and the sequence that is left is deemed the key sequence.
Let's pretend there is an eavesdropper present, who goes by the name of Eve. Eve seeks to listen in and has the same tools as Bob in order to do so successfully. However, Bob has the benefit of being able to converse with Alice in order to check which polarizer type was used for each photon, but Eve does not. Eve is ultimately responsible for rendering the final key.
Alice and Bob would also be aware if Eve was listening in on their conversation. After Eve observes the flow of photons, the photon locations that Alice and Bob anticipate to see will be altered as a result of her observations.
Well, that’s all pretty mind-blowing, but for us, the general public, the biggest question is…
Is it really used?
Although the model described above has not yet been fully developed, there have been successful implementations of it, including the following:
The University of Cambridge and the Toshiba Corporation collaborated to develop a high-bit-rate quantum key distribution system based on the BB84 quantum cryptography protocol;
DARPA's Quantum Network, which operated from 2002 to 2007, was a 10-node QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) network constructed by Boston University, Harvard University, and IBM Research. It was operated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;
Quantum Xchange created the first quantum network in the United States, which is comprised of over 1,000 kilometers of optical fiber;
The development of commercial QKD systems was also carried out by commercial businesses such as ID Quantique, Toshiba, Quintessence Labs, and MagiQ Technologies Inc.
As you can see, these rare implementations are pretty far from what you’d expect to use every day. But hopefully, that will change in the near future.
The pros and cons of quantum cryptography
As with any developing technology, the state of it now (2022), may be very different to its state in the future. Thus, the following table may change dramatically. We do believe, however, that we’ll see fewer points in the ‘Limitations’ column as the years go on.
The need for unbreakable encryption is right there staring us down. The development of quantum computers is on the horizon, and the security of encrypted data is now in jeopardy due to the threat of quantum computing. We are fortunate in that quantum cryptography, in the form of QKD, provides us with the answer we need to protect our information long into the future — all while adhering to the difficult laws of quantum physics.
End-to-end encryption has been introduced by many communication providers in recent years, notably WhatsApp and Zoom. Although those companies have tried to explain the concept to their user base several times, we believe they failed. Whilst it's clear that these platforms have increased security, most don’t know how or why. Well, encryption is a rather simple concept to understand: It converts data into an unreadable format. But what exactly does "end-to-end" imply? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this added layer of security? We'll explain this as simply as possible without diving too much into the underlying math and technical terminology.
What is end-to-end encryption?
End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is a state-of-the-art protocol for communication security. Only the sender and the intended recipient(s) have access to the data in an end-to-end encrypted system. The encrypted data on the server is inaccessible to both hackers and undesirable third parties.
End-to-end encryption is best understood when compared to the encryption-in-transit approach, so let’s perform a quick recap. If a service employs encryption-in-transit, it is usually encrypted on your device before being delivered to the server. It’s then decrypted for processing on the server before it’s re-encrypted and routed to its final destination. When the data is in transit, it’s encrypted, but when it’s ‘at rest’, it’s decrypted. This safeguards the data during the most dangerous stage of the journey, transit — when it’s most exposed to hackers, interception, and theft.
End-to-end encryption, on the other hand, is the process of encrypting data on your device and not decrypting it until it reaches its destination. When your message travels through the server, not even the service that is delivering the data can view the content of your message.
In practice, this means that messengers using 'real' end-to-end encryption, like Signal, know only your phone number and the date of your last login – nothing more.
This is important for users that want to be sure their communication is kept secure from prying eyes. There are also some real-life examples that utilize end-to-end encryption for financial transactions and commercial communication.
How does it work?
The generation of a public-private key pair ensures the security of end-to-end encryption. This method, also known as asymmetric cryptography, encrypts and decrypts the message using distinct cryptographic keys. Public keys are widely distributed and are used to encrypt or ‘lock’ messages. Only the owner has access to the private keys, which are needed to unlock or decrypt the communication.
Whenever the user takes part in any end-to-end encrypted communication, the system automatically generates dedicated public and private keys.
If this sounds too complicated, here is a verysimple metaphor:
You just bought a new Rolex for your buddy, who lives in Australia. Now, it’s already in a fancy green leather box, so you decide to put the stamp directly on it and send it. There is nothing wrong with that approach as long as you trust that the postal workers won’t steal it.
However, if you decide to put the Rolex box inside another box, hiding the nature of the gift from all interacting parties along the way, then you’ve effectively ensured (for all intents and purposes) that the Rolex is only visible to the intended recipient; when your mate from down under gets a hold of the box, he takes his pair of scissors and ‘decrypts’ the present. Indeed, you’ve ensured ‘end-to-end’ encryption.
You’re already using end-to-end encryption, daily
As we mentioned before, during an E2EE interaction, the server that delivers encrypted data between one "end" and the other "end" is unable to decode and read the data it sends. Even the servers' owners are unable to access the information since it is not saved on the servers themselves, only the "endpoints" (or the devices) of the discussion can decode the data.
If you’re daily using messengers like WhatsApp, iMessage, and Signal (where E2EE is enabled by default) or Telegram, Allo, and Facebook's ‘Secret Conversation’ function (where E2EE can be manually activated) – you’re already using end-to-end encryption.
What's more fascinating is that E2EE communication providers don't require you to trust them. And that’s great!
The fact that their systems can be hacked makes no difference to you because the transported data is encrypted and can only be read by the sender and receiver, which has enraged several organizations. There are known cases when such agencies asked for special ‘backdoors’ that would allow them to decrypt messages.
Why isn’t everything end-to-end encrypted?
End-to-end encryption is theoretically sound, but it lacks flexibility, thus it can't be utilized when the "two ends" that communicate data don't exist, such as with cloud storage.
This is why Zero-Knowledge Encryption was created, a solution that overcomes the problem by hiding the encryption key, even from the storage provider, resulting in an authentication request without the requirement for password exchange.
Moreover, end-to-end encryption does not hide information about the message, such as the date and time it was sent or the people who participated in the conversation. This metadata might provide indications on where the 'end-point' might be – not great if you are the target of a hacker.
The biggest problem, however, is that in reality, we never know whether the communication is end-to-end encrypted. Providers may claim to provide end-to-end encryption when what they truly deliver is encryption-in-transit. The information might be kept on a third-party server that can be accessed by anybody who has access to the server.
Conclusion
While it’s obvious that you shouldn’t be shipping Dave’s Rolex in its fancy green box, the reality is, if you’ve nothing to hide and you’re not transporting something incredibly valuable, encryption-in-transit is up to the job.
End-to-end encryption is a wonderful technology that enables a high level of security when properly implemented. But it doesn't really tackle the main issue – the end-user, still, to this day, needs to trust the system that they’re using to communicate. We hope that the next generation of encryption technologies such as ZKP will be able to change that.
In this year of our lord, 2022, the term ‘Zero-Knowledge Encryption’ equates to best-in-class data insurance. We’ve already written an article named “What is Zero-Knowledge Proof?”, so we’re not going to look at definitions here, but rather, we’re going to explore the pros and cons of Zero-Knowledge proof encryption when compared to other technologies.
But for those who don’t want to dive deep into technical details, here’s an explanation of what Zero-Knowledge Encryption means:
It simply implies that no one else (not even the service provider) has access to your password-protected data.
This is important because even if your files are completely encrypted, if the server has access to the keys, a centralized hacker attack can result in a data breach.
In order to gain a better understanding of the factors that led to the development of Zero-Knowledge Encryption, we've decided to present a succinct, yet comprehensive, assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of three existing options:
Encryption-in-transit
Data in-transit, also known as data in motion, is data that is actively flowing from one point to another, such as that over the internet or over a private network. Data protection in transit refers to the security of data while it is being transferred from one network to another or from a local storage device to a cloud storage device. Effective data protection measures for in-transit data are critical because data is often considered less secure while in transit. Think of it like hiring security guards to accompany your cash-in-transit vehicle’s trip to the bank.
This means that, while using this approach, stored docs are 100% decryptable, so vulnerable.
As for our everyday life, the following technologies use the ‘encryption-in-transit’approach:
Any data encryption is the process of converting one type of data into another that cannot be decrypted by unauthorized users. For example, you may have saved a copy of your passport. You obviously don't want this data to be easily accessed. If you store encrypted data on your server, it’s effectively "resting" there (which is why it’s called encryption-at-rest). This is usually accomplished by the use of an algorithm that is incomprehensible to a user who does not have access to the encryption key needed to decode it. Only an authorized person will be able to access the file, ensuring that your data is kept safe.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is often used to encrypt data at rest.
But, in order to access the data, you need a key — and that’s where the potential vulnerability lies.
Encryption-at-rest is like storing your data in a secret vault, encryption-in-transit is like putting it in an armored vehicle with security guards for transport.
End-to-end encryption
End-to-end encryption is the act of applying encryption to messages on one device so that only the device to which it is sent can decrypt it. The message travels all the way from the sender to the recipient in encrypted form.
In practice, it means that only the communicating users (who have the key) can read the messages.
End-to-end encryption has created an impregnable fortress for communication services (for example, messengers), going beyond the security "façade" of encryption-in-transit and encryption-at-rest solutions.
This is the most common approach when protecting oneself against data breaches nowadays, but it only works from "one end to the other," as the term implies. Even though this all sounds great, end-to-end encryption can only be used for a "communication system" like Whatsapp or Telegram.
While theoretically sound, end-to-end encryption lacks flexibility, so it can’t be used when the "two ends" that share data don't exist, such as for cloud storage.
This is the motivation behind the development of Zero-Knowledge Encryption, a method that solves the problem by hiding the encryption key, even from the storage provider, resulting in an authentication request without the need for password exchange.
Zero-Knowledge encryption
To log in to an account, you usually have to type in the exact password. In today's hyperconnected world, it's normal practice to tell the server your secret key ahead of time and test whether it matches.
Instead, there is another, more secure way, to manage this delicate process and that’s called Zero-Knowledge Encryption.
Without diving deep, The Zero-Knowledge relies on three main requirements:
Completeness — an honest prover will be able to convince the verifier that he has the password by completing some process in the required way;
Soundness — the verifier will almost certainly discover when the prover is lying;
Zero-knowledge — if the prover has a password, the verifier receives no more information other than the fact that the statement is true.
Essentially, the system will check to see if you can demonstrate your knowledge several times by responding to various conditions. It’s like a brute force attack carried out backwards — you perform the same action many times in order to make sure that the prover isn’t lying.
Instead of concluding, let’s round up the pros and cons of Zero-Knowledge proof encryption when compared to the alternatives:
The con here is a clear example of the exceptional security provided by the Zero-Knowledge Encryption solution, which prevents even system administrators from recovering your password. This is why we, at Passwork, rely on this technology in our products. Ultimately, that’s why you can rely on us too.
Many times, we’ve mentioned self-signed certificates and their most common use cases in our blog. After all, the main difference between a regular certificate and a self-signed one is that in the latter case, you act as the CA (Certificate Authority). But there are a variety of services that provide CA services for free, with the most popular being ‘Let’s Encrypt’, which is going to be the subject of this article.
What’s that?
‘Let’s Encrypt’ is a free certificate authority developed by the Internet Security Research Group (ISRG).
It provides free TLS/SSL certificates to any suitable client via the ACME (Automatic Certificate Management Environment) protocol. You can use these certificates to encrypt communication between your web server and your users. ‘Let's Encrypt’ provides two types of certificates. Single-domain SSL and Wildcard SSL, which covers a single domain and all of its subdomains. Both types of SSL certificates have a 90-day validity period. These domain-validated certificates do not require a dedicated IP address. They accomplish this by delivering the client a unique token and then retrieving a key generated from that token via an HTTP or DNS request.
There are dozens of clients available which can be easily integrated with a variety of standard administrative tools, services, and servers. They also come written in a range of different computer languages.
We'll use the win-acme client in this tutorial because it's a basic, open-source, and constantly updated command-line application. It not only produces certificates but also automatically installs and renews them. And yes, this tutorial is for Windows users.
How does it work?
‘Let's Encrypt’ verifies the ownership of your domain before issuing a certificate. On your server, the Let's Encrypt client creates a temporary file (a token) with the required information. The Let's Encrypt validation server then sends an HTTP request to get the file and validates the token, ensuring that your domain's DNS record resolves to the ‘Let's Encrypt’ client-server.
In an HTTP-based challenge, for example, the client will generate a key from a unique token and an account token, then save the results in a file that the web server will serve. The file is then retrieved from the Let's Encrypt servers at: http://passwork.com/.well-known/acme-challenge/token.
The client has demonstrated that it can control resources on example.com if the key is correct, and the server will sign and provide a certificate.
How do I set it up?
Before we start:
Make sure that you’ve downloaded the latest version of the application on the server from its Github release page;
Scroll down to ‘assets’ and download the zip package named win-acme.v2.x.x.x.zip from the release page. If you're having difficulty with Internet Explorer, you may install Chrome on the server following this approach. Once the application has been downloaded, unpack it and save it somewhere safe for future use.
Now let’s Generate the Let’s Encrypt Certificates
Simply run wacs.exe to generate the Let's Encrypt certificates. Because we downloaded the application via the internet, you may receive a notification from Windows Defender claiming that "Windows protected your PC". Because of this, after clicking the "More Info" link, click the "Run Anyway" option. Because it’s open-source and widely utilized, the application is completely safe to use.
Follow these simple steps once the application has started:
Choose N in the main menu to create a new certificate with default settings;
Choose how you want to determine the domain name(s) that you want to include in the certificate. These may be derived from the bindings of an IIS site, or you can input them manually;
A registration is created with the ACME server if no existing one can be found. You will be asked to agree to its terms of service and to provide an email address that the administrators can use to contact you;
The program negotiates with the ACME server to try and prove your ownership of the domain(s) that you want to create the certificate for. By default, the http validation mode is picked and handled by our self-hosting plugin. Getting validation right is often the most tricky part of getting an ACME certificate. If there are problems, please check out some of the common issues for an answer;
After the proof has been provided, the program gets the new certificate from the ACME server and updates or creates IIS bindings as required, according to the logic documented here;
The program remembers all choices that you made while creating the certificate and applies them for each subsequent renewal.
And that’s pretty much it. It will successfully generate an SSL certificate for you if your domain is pointing to your server. It will also include a scheduled task that will renew the certificate when it expires. The SSL certificate will be installed automatically by the application.
Are there other options?
‘Certbot’ is the most widely used kind of ‘Let's Encrypt’ client. We didn’t give it much light in this article because it's “designed for Linux” and also a little more advanced. It comes with easy-to-use automatic configuration features for Apache and Nginx. And yes, there is a Windows version as well.
There are many other clients to choose from – the ACME protocol is open and well-documented. On their website, ‘Let's Encrypt’ keeps track of all ACME clients.
Here’s a list of the best options (n.b. most are for Linux):
lego. Lego is a one-file binary installation written in Go that supports many DNS providers;
acme.sh. Acme.sh is a simple shell script that can run in non-privileged mode and interact with more than 30 different DNS providers;
Caddy. Caddy is a full web server written in Go with built-in support for Let’s Encrypt.
‘Let’s Encrypt’ is just great, there are no other ways to put it. It’s a free, automated, and open certificate authority, run for the public’s benefit. It can be accessed via a variety of tools and services. The best part is, they really keep their motto close to heart:
“We give people the digital certificates they need in order to enable HTTPS (SSL/TLS) for websites, for free, in the most user-friendly way we can. We do this because we want to create a more secure and privacy-respecting Web for all.”
It is rare for technologies to be born from ambitious philosophical concepts or mind games. But, when it comes to security and cryptography – everything is a riddle.
One of such riddles is ‘How can you prove that you know a secret without giving it away?’. Or in other words, ‘how can you tell someone you love them without saying that you love them?’.
The Zero-Knowledge Proof technique, as suggested by the name, uses cryptographic algorithms to allow several parties to verify the authenticity of a piece of information without having to share the material that makes it up. But how is it possible to prove something without supporting evidence? In this article, we’ll try our best to break it down for you as easily as possible.
Why?
We’re asking ourselves day after day – why on Earth would people decide to use such a complicated concept. Well, millions of people use the internet every day, accepting cookies and sharing personal information in exchange for access to services and digital products. Users are gradually becoming more vulnerable to security breaches and unauthorized access to their data. Furthermore, individuals frequently have to give up their privacy in return for digital platform services such as suggestions, consultations, tailored support, and so on, all of which wouldn’t be available when browsing privately. Due to all the above mentioned, there is a certain asymmetry regarding access to information – you give your information in exchange for a service.
In 1985, three great minds noticed ‘a great disturbance in the Force’ ahead of their time and released a paper called "The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof-Systems" which introduced the concept of Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) for the first time.
So what is it?
ZKP is a set of tools that allows an item of data to be evaluated without having to reveal the data that supports it. This is made feasible by a set of cryptographic methods that allow a "tester" to mathematically prove to a "verifier" that a computational statement is valid without disclosing any data.
It is possible to establish that particular facts are correct without having to share them with a third party in this way. For example, a user could demonstrate that he is of legal age to access a product or service without having to reveal his exact age. Or, it’s a bit like showing your friend your driving license instead of proving to him that you can drive by road-tripping to Mexico.
This technique is often used in the digital world to authenticate systems without the risk of information being stolen. Indeed, it’s no longer necessary to provide any personal data in order to establish a person's identity.
Sounds great, but how does it work?
The prover and the verifier are the two most important roles in zero-knowledge proofs. The prover must demonstrate that they are aware of the secret whereas the verifier must be able to determine whether or not the prover is lying.
It works because the verifier asks the prover to do actions that can only be done if the prover is certain that he or she is aware of the secret. If the prover is guessing, the verifier's tests will catch him or her out. If the secret is known, the prover will pass the verifier's exam with flying colors every time. It's similar to when a bank or other institution requests letters from a known secret word in order to authenticate your identity. You're not telling the bank how much money you have in your account; you're simply demonstrating that you know.
Assume that two characters, Alice and Bob, find themselves at the mouth of a cave with two independent entrances leading to two different paths (A and B). A door inside the cave connects both paths, but it can only be unlocked with a secret code. This code belongs to Bob (the 'tester,') and Alice (the 'verifier,') wants to buy it, but first, she wants to make sure Bob isn't lying.
How can Bob demonstrate to Alice that he has the code without divulging its contents? They perform the following to achieve this: Bob enters the cave via one of the entrances at random while Alice waits outside (A or B). Once inside, Alice approaches the front door, summons Bob, and instructs him to use one of the two exits. Bob will always be able to return by the path that Alice used since he knows the secret code.
Bob will always be able to return via the path that Alice directs him to, even if it does not coincide with the one he chose in the first place, because he can unlock the door and depart through the other side with the secret code.
But wait a minute, there is still a 50% chance that both Alice and Bob chose the same path, right? It is correct indeed, however, if this exercise is repeated several times, the likelihood that Bob will escape along the same path chosen by Alice without possessing the code decreases until it is almost impossible. Conclusion? If Bob leaves this path a sufficient number of times, he has unmistakably shown to Alice that his claim of holding the secret code is true. Moreover, there was no need to reveal the actual code in this case.
You can find out more about the Bob and Alice metaphor here.
Got it, so how is it used?
As for right now, ZKP is developing hand in hand with blockchain technology.
Zcash is a crypto platform that uses a unique iteration of zero-knowledge proofs (called zk-SNARKs). It allows native transactions to stay entirely encrypted while still being confirmed under the network's consensus rules. It’s a great example of this technology being used in practice.
Even though zero-knowledge proofs have a lot of potential to change the way today's data systems verify information, the technology is still considered to be in its infancy — primarily because researchers are still figuring out how to best use this concept while identifying any potential flaws. This, however, doesn’t stop us from using this protocol in our products! ;)
For a deeper understanding of the technical aspects and history behind this protocol, we recommend watching this video on YouTube.
Cryptography is both beautiful and terrifying. Perhaps a bit like your ex-wife. Despite this, it represents a vital component of day-to-day internet security; without it, our secrets kept in the digital world would be exposed to everyone, even your employer. I doubt you’d want information regarding your sexual preferences to be displayed to the regional sales manager while at an interview with Goldman Sachs, right?
Computers are designed to do exactly what we ask them to do. But sometimes there are certain things that we don’t want them to do, like expose your data through some kind of backdoor. This is where cryptography comes into play. It transforms useful data into something that can’t be understood without the proper credentials.
Let’s take a look at an example. Most internet services need to store their users’ password data on their own servers. But they can’t store the exact values that people input on their devices because, in the event of a data breach, malevolent intruders would effectively gain access to a simple spreadsheet of all usernames and passwords.
This is where ‘Hash’ and ‘Salt’ help us a lot. Throughout this article, we’re going to explain these two important encryption concepts through simple functions in Node.JS.
What is a ‘hash’?
A ‘hash’ literally means something that has been chopped and mixed, and originally was used to describe a kind of food. Now, chopping and mixing are exactly what the hash function does! You start with some data, you pass it through a hash function where it gets whisked and chopped, and then you watch it get transformed into a fixed-length value (which at first sight seems pretty meaningless). The important nuance here is that, contrary to cooking, an input always produces a corresponding output. For the purposes of cryptography, such a hash function should be easily computable and all values should be unique. It should work in a similar way to mashing potatoes – mashing is a one-way process; the raw potato may not be restored once it has been mashed. Indeed, the result of a hash function should be impenetrable to computer-led reverse engineering efforts.
These properties come in handy when you’re looking to store user passwords on a database – you don’t want anyone to know their real values.
First, let’s import the createHash function from the built-in ‘crypto’ module:
const { createHash } = require ('crypto');
Next, we ought to define the module that we’re naming as the ‘hash’ (which takes a string as the input, and returns a hash as the output):
function hash(input) {
return createHash();
}
We also need to specify the hashing algorithm that we want to use. In our case, it will be SHA256. SHA stands for Secure Hash Algorithm and it returns a 256-bit digest (output). It is important to architect your code so it is easy to switch between algorithms because at some point in time they won’t be secure anymore. Remember, cryptography is always evolving.
function hash(input) {
return createHash('sha256');
}
Once we call our hashing function, we may call ‘update’ with the input value and return the output by calling ‘digest’. We should also specify the format of the output (e.g. hex). In our case, we’ll go with Base64.
function hash(input) {
return createHash('sha256').update(input).digest('base64');
}
Now that we have our hash function, we can provide some input, and console log the result.
let youShallNotPassPass = 'admin1234';
const hashRes1 = hash(youShallNotPassPass);
console.log(hashRes1)
So, how can we use this long, convoluted string of numbers, letters, and symbols? Well, now it’s easy to compare two values while operating with only hashes.
let youShallNotPassPass = 'admin1234';
const hashRes1 = hash(youShallNotPassPass);
const hashRes2 = hash(youShallNotPassPass);
const isThereMatch = hashRes1 === hashRes2;
console.log(isThereMatch ? 'hashes match' : 'hashes do not match’)
As long as hash values are unique object representations, they can be useful for object identification. For example, they might be used to iterate through objects in an array or find a specific one in the database.
But we have a problem. Hash functions are very predictable. On top of that, people don’t use strong passwords that often, so the hacker may just compare the hashes on a database with a precomputed spreadsheet of the most common passwords. If the values match – the password is compromised.
Because of this, it’s insufficient to just use a hash function to store unique ids on a password database.
And that’s where our second topic makes an entrance – Salt.
‘Salt’ is a bit like the mineral salt that you would add to a batch of mashed potatoes – the taste will definitely depend on the amount and type of salt used. This is exactly what salt in cryptography is – random data that is used as an additional input to a hash function. Its use makes it much harder to guess what exact data stands behind a certain hash.
We use ‘Scrypt’ because it’s designed to be expensive computationally and memory-wise in order to make brute-force attacks unrewarding. It’s also used as proof of work in cryptocurrency mining.
Now that we have hashed the password, we need to store the accompanying salt in our database. We can do this by appending it to the hashed password with a semicolon as a separator:
const user = { nickname, password: salt + ':' + hashedPassword}
Here’s our final signup function:
function signup(nickname, password) {
const salt = randomBytes(16).toString('base64');
const hashedPassword = scryptSync(password, salt, 64).toString('base64');
const user = { nickname, password: salt + ':' + hashedPassword};
users.push(user);
return user;
}
Now let’s create our login function. When the user wants to log in, we can grab the salt from our database to recreate the original hash:
//We register the user:
const user = signup('Amy', '1234');
//We try to login with the wrong pass:
let isSuccess = login('Amy', '12345');
console.log(isSuccess ? 'Login success' : 'Wrong password!')
//Wrong password!
//We try to login with the correct pass:
isSuccess = login('Amy', '1234')
console.log(isSuccess ? 'Login success' : 'Wrong password!')
//Login success
Our example, hopefully, has provided you with a very simplified explanation of the signup and login process. It’s important to note that our code is not protected against timing attacks and it doesn’t use PKI infrastructure to check hashes, so there are plenty of vulnerabilities for hackers to exploit.
Cryptography itself can be described as the constant war between hackers and cryptographic engineers. Or, that familiar legal battle with your ex-wife over her maintenance payments. After all, what works today may not work tomorrow. A proof of MD5 hash algorithm vulnerability is a very good example.
So if your task is to ensure your users’ data privacy, be ready to constantly update your functions to counteract the recent ‘breakthroughs’.
Let's imagine that you decided to google ‘best sauces for Wagyu steak’. You went through several web pages, and then on page two of the search results, you get this notification from your Chrome browser:
Something went wrong, that's for sure. What happened? Should you proceed to the page without a private connection?
An IT expert would surely reply:
The error that you got here was probably because of an SSL/TLS handshake failure.
SSL? TLS?? Acronyms you’ve no doubt heard before, but ones that nevertheless evoke a dreary sense of confusion in the untrained mind. In this article, we’ll try to explain what SSL/TLS is, how it works and at the very least, you’ll understand what that lock icon on the address bar is.
Where did TLS originate?
TLS stands for Transport Layer Security, and it is right now the most common kind of Web PKI. It’s used not only to encrypt internet browsing but also for end-to-end connection (video calling, messaging, gaming, etc.).
As for now, we expect almost any kind of connection on the internet to be encrypted, and if something is encrypted, we get an alert similar to that seen in figure A. But that wasn't always the case. If you go back to the mid-90s – very little on the internet was encrypted. Maybe that was because fewer people were using the internet back then, or maybe it was because there weren’t credit-card details flying all over the place.
The history of TLS starts with Netscape. In 1994, it developed Secure Socket Layer 1 – the grandfather of modern TLS. Technically, it fits between TCP and HTTP as a security layer. While version 1 was used only internally and was full of bugs, very quickly, they fixed all the issues and released SSL 2. Then, Netscape patented it in 1995 with a view to stopping other people patenting it so they could release it for free. This was a very odd yet generous move, considering what the real-life patent practice was at that time.
In 1995, the world was introduced to Internet Explorer, a browser that used a rival technology called PCT (Private Communications Technology), which was very similar to SSL. But as with any rivalry – there could only be one winner. In November 1996, SSL 3 was released, which, of course, was an improvement on SSL 2. Right after that, the Internet Engineering Task Force created the Transport Layer Security Working Group to decide what the new standard for internet encryption would be. It was subsequently renamed from SSL to TLS (as far as we know, this was because Microsoft didn't want Netscape to have dibs on the name). It actually took three years for the group to release TLS 1. It was so similar to SSL 3 that people began to name it SSL 3.1. But over time, through updates, the security level rose massively; bugs were terminated, ciphers were improved, protocols were updated etc.
How does TLS actually work?
TLS is a PKI protocol that exists between two parties. They effectively have to agree on certain things to identify each other as trustworthy. This process of identification is called a 'handshake'.
Let’s take a look at a TLS 1.2 handshake, as an example.
First, let's load any webpage, then, depending on your browser, press the lock icon near the web address text field. You’ll be shown certificate info and somewhere between the lines you'll find a string like this:
This is called a Cipher Suite. It’s a string-like representation of our 'handshake' recipe.
So, let’s go through some of the things shown here:
First, we have ECDHE (Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman), which is a key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic-curve public–private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. In layman’s terms, this is known as key exchange;
The RSA is our Public Key authentication mechanism (remember, we need a Public Key for any PKI);
AES256 refers to the cipher that we’re going to use (AES) and its' key size (256);
Lastly, SHA384 is effectively a building block that is used to perform hash functions.
Now, the trick is to exchange all that data in just several messages via our 'handshake'.
What exactly happens when we go to a new web page?
After we establish a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection, we start our handshake. As always on the web, the user (Client) is requesting data from the Server – so he sends a 'Client Hello' message, which contains a bunch of data including:
The max TLS version that this Client can support so that both parties are able to 'speak the same language;
A random number to protect from replay attacks;
List of the cipher suites that the Client supports.
Assuming the Server is live, it responds with 'Server Hello', containing the Cipher Suite and TLS version it chose to connect with the Client + a random number. If the server can't choose a Suite or TLS version due to version incompatibility – it sends back a TLS Alert with a handshake failure. At this point, both the User and the Server know the communication protocol.
Keep in mind that the server is sending a Public key and a Certificate containing an RSA key. It’s important to know that the Certificate has an expiration date. You’ll understand why by the end of the article.
On top of that, the Server is sending a Server Key Exchange Message containing parameters for ECDHE with a public value. Very importantly, this Exchange Message also contains a digital signature (all previous messages are summarized using a hash function and signed using the private key of the Server). This signature is crucial because it provides proof that the Server is who they say they are.
When the Server is done transmitting all the above-mentioned messages, it sends a 'Server Hello Done' message. In Layman’s terms, that’s an ‘I’m done for the day, I’ll see you at the pub’ kind of message.
The Client, on the other hand, will look at the Certificate and verify it. After that, it will verify the signature using the Certificate (you can't have one without the other). If all goes well, the Client is assured of the Server’s authenticity and sends a Client Key Exchange Message. This message doesn't contain a Certificate but does contain a Premaster Secret. It is then combined with the random numbers that were generated during the ‘Hello’ messages to produce a Master Secret. The Master Secret is going to be used for encryption at the next step.
It may seem very complicated now, but we’re almost done!
The next stage involves the Client sending the ‘Change Cipher Spec’ message, which basically says "I’ve got everything, so I can begin encryption – the next message I'll send you is going to be encrypted with parameters and keys".
After that, the Client proceeds to send the ‘Finished’ message containing a summary of all the messages so far encrypted. This helps to ensure that nobody fiddled with the messages; if the Server can't decrypt the message, it leaves the 'conversation'.
The Server will reply in the same way – with a Change Cipher Spec and a Finished message.
Handshaking is now done, parties can exchange HTTP requests/responses and load data. By the way, the only difference between HTTP and HTTPS is that the last one is secure – that's what the 'S' stands for there.
As you can see, it's incredibly difficult to crack this system open. However, that's exactly what we need to ensure security. Moreover, those two round trips that the data travels take no time at all, which is great; nobody wants their GitHub to take a month and a half to load up. By the way, the more advanced TLS 1.3 does all that in just one round trip!
Your connection is not private
When something goes wrong with TLS, you’ll see the warning that we demonstrated at the very beginning of this article. Usually, those are issues associated with the Certificate and its expiration date. That’s why your internet will refuse to work if you’ve messed around with the time and date settings on your device. But, if everything with the date and time is in check – never proceed to a website that triggers this warning, because most likely, between you and the server, somebody is parsing your private data.
Let’s imagine that somehow you’re in the driver’s seat of a start-up, and a successful one too. You’ve successfully passed several investment rounds and you’re well on your way to success. Now, big resources lead to big data and with big data, there’s a lot of responsibility. Managing data in such a company is a struggle, especially considering that data is usually structured in an access hierarchy – Excel tables and Google Docs just don’t cut the cake anymore. Instead, the company yearns for a protocol well equipped to manage data. The company yearns for LDAP.
What is LDAP?
The story of LDAP starts at the University of Michigan in the early 1990s when a graduate student, Tim Howes, was tasked with creating a campus-wide directory using the X.500 computer networking standard. Unfortunately, accessing X.500 records was impossible without a dedicated server. Additionally, there was no such thing as a ‘client app’. As a result, Howes co-created DIXIE, a directory client for X.500. This work set the foundations for LDAP, a standards-based version of DIXIE for both clients and servers – an acronym for the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
It was designed to maintain a data hierarchy for small bits of information. Unlike ‘Finder’ on your Mac, or ‘Windows Explorer’ on your PC, the ‘files’ inside the directory tree, although small, are contained in a very hierarchical order – exactly what you need to organize, for example, your HR structure, or when accessing a file. Compared to good old Excel, it is not a program, but rather a protocol. Essentially, a set of tools that allow users to find the information that they need very quickly.
Importantly, this protocol answers three key questions regarding data management:
— Who? Users must authenticate themselves in order to access directories. — How? A special language is used that provides for query or data manipulations. — Where? Data is stored and organized in a proper manner.
Let’s now go through these key questions in greater detail.
Who?
It’s bad taste to provide internal data to any old Joe. That’s why LDAP users cannot access information without first proving their identity.
LDAP authentication involves verifying provided usernames and passwords by connecting with a directory service that uses the LDAP protocol. All this data is stored in what is referred to as a core user. This is a lot like logging into Facebook, where you’re only able to access a user’s feed and photos if they’ve accepted your friend request, or if their profile has been set to public.
Some companies that require advanced security use a Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), for example, Kerberos, for the authentication process.
In addition, to ensure the maximum safety of LDAP messages, as soon as data is accessed via devices outside the company’s walls, Transport Layer Security (TLS) may be used.
How?
The main task of a data management system is to provide “many things to many users”.
Rather than creating a complex system for each type of information service, LDAP provides a handful of common APIs (LDAP commands) to do this. Supporting applications, of course, have to be written to use these APIs properly. Still, the LDAP provides the basic service of locating information and can thus be used to store information for other system services, such as DNS, DHCP, etc.
Basic LDAP commands
Let’s look at the ‘Search’ LDAP command as an example, if you’d like to know which group a particular user is a part of, you might need to input something like this:
Isn’t it beautiful? Not quite as simple as performing a Google search, that’s for sure. So, your employees will perform all their directory services tasks through a point-and-click management interface like Varonis DatAdvantage.
All those interfaces may vary depending on their configuration, which is why new employees should be trained to use them, even if they’ve used LDAP before.
Where?
As we mentioned before, LDAP has the structure of a tree of information. Starting with the roots, it contains hierarchical nodes relating to a variety of data, by which the query may then be answered.
The root node of the tree doesn't really exist and can't be accessed directly. There is a special entry called the root directory specific entry, or rootDSE, that contains a description of the whole tree, its layout, and its contents. But, this really isn't the root of the tree itself. Each entry contains a set of properties, or attributes, in which data values are stored.
The tree itself is called the directory information tree (DIT). Branches of this tree contain all the data on the LDAP server. Every branch leads to a leaf in the end – a data entry, or directory service entry (DSE). These entries contain actual records that describe objects such as users, computers, settings, etc.
For example, such a tree for your company could start with the description of a position held, starting with you at the top as the director, finishing at the bottom with Joe Bloggs, the intern.
Each position would be tied to a person with a set of attributes, complete with links to subordinates. The attributes for a person may include their name, surname, phone number, email, in addition to their responsibilities. Each attribute would have a value inside, like ‘Joe’ for name and ‘Bloggs’ for surname.
The actual data contents may vary, as they totally depend on use. For example, you could have data issuing rights to certain people regarding the coffee machine. So, no Frappuccino for our intern Joe.
Sure, you can add more sophisticated data regarding each individual – their personal family trees, or even voice samples for instance, but typically, the LDAP would just point to the place where such data can be found.
Is it worth it?
LDAP is able to aggregate information from different sources, making it easier for an enterprise to manage information. But as with any type of data organization, the biggest difficulty is creating a proper design for your tree. There is always trial and error involved while building a directory for a specific corporate structure. Sometimes this process is so difficult that it even results in the reorganization of the company itself in favor of the hierarchical model. Despite this, for almost thirty years, the LDAP has held its title as the most efficient solution for the organization of corporate data.
Imagine you’re a system administrator at Home Depot. Just as you’re about to head home, you notice that your network has just authorized the connection of a new air-conditioner. Nothing too peculiar, right? The next morning, you wake up to find that terabytes of data including logins, passwords and customer credit card information have been transferred to hackers. Well, that’s exactly what happened in 2014, when a group of hackers, under the guise of an unassuming HVAC system, landed an attack that cost Home Depot over $17.5 million dollars, all over an incorrectly configured PKI. In this article, we’ll be conducting a crash course in PKI management.
So, what’s a PKI?
‘Public key infrastructure’ is a term that relates to a set of measures and policies that allow one to deploy and manage one of the most common forms of online encryption – public-key encryption. Apart from being a key-keeper for your browser, the PKI also secures a variety of different infrastructures, including internal communication within organizations, Internet of Things (IoT), peer to peer connection, and so on. There are two main types of PKIs:
• The Web PKI, also known as the “Internet PKI”, has been defined by RFC 5280 and refined by the CA/Browser Forum. It works by default with browsers and pretty much everything else that uses TLS (you probably use it every day).
• An Internal PKI – is the one you run for your own needs. We’re talking about encrypted local networks, data containers, enterprise IT applications or corporate endpoints like laptops and phones. Generally speaking, it can be used for anything that you want to identify.
At its core, PKI has a public cryptographic key that is used not to encrypt your data, but rather to authenticate the identities of the communicating parties. It’s like the bouncer outside an up-market club in Mayfair – you’re not getting in if you’re not on the list. However, without this ‘bouncer’, the concept of trustworthy online communication would be thrown to the wind.
So, how does it work?
PKI is built around two main concepts – keys and certificates. As with an Enigma machine, where the machine’s settings are used to encrypt a message (or establish a secure protocol), a key within a PKIisa long string of bits used to encrypt or decrypt encoded data. The main difference between the Enigma machine and a PKI is that with the latter, you have to somehow let your recipient know the settings used to encode the encrypted message.
The PKI gets its name because each party in a secured connection has two keys: public and private. A generic cipher protocol on the other hand, usually only uses a private one.
The public key is known to everyone and is used throughout the network to encode data, but the data cannot be accessed without a private key, which is used for decoding. These two keys are bound by complex mathematical functions which are difficult to reverse-engineer or crack by brute force. By the way, this principle is an epitome of asymmetrical cryptography.
So, this is how data is encrypted within a public key infrastructure. But let’s not forget that identity verification is just as important when dealing with PKIs – that’s where certificates come into play.
Digital Identity
PKI certificates are most commonly seen as digital passports containing lots of assigned data. One of the most important pieces of information in such a certificate relates to the public key: the certificate is the mechanism by which that key is shared – just like your Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) or driver’s license, for instance.
But it’s not really valid unless it has been issued by some kind of entrusted authority. In our case, this is the certificate authority (CA). Here, there is an attestation from a trusted source that the entity is who they claim to be.
With this in mind, it becomes very easy to grasp what the PKI consists of:
• A certificate authority, which issues digital certificates, signs them with its public key and stores them in a repository for reference;
• A registration authority, which verifies the identities of those requesting digital certificates. A CA can act as its registration authority or can use a third party to do so;
• A certificate database that stores both the certificates, their metadata and, most importantly, their expiration dates;
• A certificate policy outlining the PKI's procedures (this is basically a set of instructions that allows others to judge how trustworthy a PKI is).
What is a PKI used for?
A PKI is great for securing web traffic – data flowing through the open internet can be easily intercepted and read if it isn't encrypted. Moreover, it can be difficult to trust a sender’s identity if there isn’t some kind of verification procedure in place.
But even though SSL/TLS certificates (that secure browsing activities) may demonstrate the most widespread implementation of PKI, the list doesn’t end there. PKI can also be used for:
• Digital signatures on software;
• Restricted access to enterprise intranets and VPNs;
• Password-free Wi-fi access based on device ownership;
• Email and data encryption procedures.
PKI use is taking off exponentially; even a microwave can connect to Instagram nowadays. This emerging world of IoT devices brings us new challenges and even devices seemingly existing in closed environments now require security. Taking the ‘evil air conditioner’ that we spoke about in the introduction as an example – gone are the days where we can take a piece of kit for face value. Some of the most compelling PKI use cases today center around IoT. Auto manufacturers and medical device manufacturers are two prime examples of industries currently introducing PKI for IoT devices. Edison’s Electronic Health Check-up System would be a very good example here, but we’ll save that for a future deep-dive.
Is PKI a cure-all?
As with any technology – execution is sometimes more important than the design itself. A recent study by the Ponemon Institute surveyed nearly 603 IT and security professionals across 14 industries to understand the current state of PKI and digital certificate management practices. This study revealed widespread gaps and challenges, for example:
• 73% of security professionals admit that digital certificates still cause unplanned downtime and application outages;
• 71% of security professionals state that migration to the cloud demands significant changes to their PKI practices;
• 76% of security professionals say that failure to secure keys and certificates undermines the trust their organization relies upon to operate.
The biggest issue, however, is that most organizations lack the resources to support PKI. Moreover, only 38% of respondents claim they have the staff to properly maintain PKI. So for most organizations PKI maintenance becomes a burden rather than a cure-all.
To sum up, PKI is a silent guard that secures the privacy of ordinary online content consumers. However, in the hands of true professionals, it becomes a power tool that creates an encryption infrastructure that is almost infinitely scalable. It lives in your browser, your phone, your Wi-fi access point, throughout the web and beyond. Most importantly, however, a correctly-configured PKI is the distance between your business and an imposter air conditioner that wants your hard-earned cash.
Password managers are a game-changer when it comes to security, convenience and efficiency. If you're new to them, you might be wondering what is the purpose of a password manager? The answer lies in avoiding the risks that come with weak or reused passwords. Managing passwords securely can be a real challenge. Cyber threats like identity theft, data breaches and more are all too real. The safest way to store passwords is with a personal password keeper.
Think of it as a simple password vault for all your login credentials. Rather than relying on your memory or insecure methods like writing them down, the safest place to keep passwords is using a password manager ensuring that all your credentials are stored in an encrypted database, accessible only through a master password. With a password manager, you can secure your password and create strong, unique passwords — no more worrying about remembering them all.
What do password managers do? They securely store passwords, and many also help in automatically filling in your credentials on websites, reducing the risk of phishing attacks. They also help with keeping passwords securely across all your devices — that means your credentials are safe wherever you access them.
Why a password manager is essential for security
The human factor in digital security
The more digital we become — the COVID-19 pandemic has certainly accelerated that — the more online accounts we have. And with that comes more passwords to keep track of. Unfortunately, human error is a leading cause of data breaches. People still use weak passwords or reuse the same credentials across multiple sites. That makes it far too easy for cybercriminals to get in. Password managers enhance your password practices to prevent vulnerabilities.
Phishing attacks have become incredibly common, and weak password practices expose businesses to risks. Is it safe to use password managers? Yes, a password manager eliminates the risk of human error and keeps your credentials safe by storing them in an encrypted database. It can automatically fill in your credentials only when a legitimate site is detected. That stops you from unknowingly entering passwords on phishing sites. And because it eliminates the risk of human error, protecting your passwords becomes much easier.
Security audits
Security audits are a key part of any business's security strategy. Weak, outdated, or compromised credentials can lead to security vulnerabilities. Businesses that fail to enforce strong password policies risk non-compliance with industry regulations.
One of the key benefits of password managers is that it can automatically alert users when passwords need updating. It also provides an audit trail, making it easier to track and manage password changes efficiently. Additionally, password managers ensure quick password rotation when an employee leaves the company, minimizing the risk of data leaks — this proactive security measure helps companies comply with industry standards and pass audits with ease.
Managing absences and staff changes
Temporary absences and staff turnover can disrupt business workflows. A business password manager ensures employees with the necessary permissions can access credentials securely. That prevents bottlenecks and inefficiencies.
For example, if a key team member is on vacation or out sick, other employees may need access to shared accounts. With a password manager, authorized team members can securely retrieve credentials without compromising security.
Disaster recovery is another critical aspect. In the unfortunate event of an emergency where key personnel are unavailable, having a secure and structured password management system ensures continuity. Companies can avoid business disruptions by ensuring authorized personnel can access critical information without compromising security policies.
Seamless access across devices and browsers
A key advantage of password managers is that they work seamlessly across multiple browsers and devices. Solutions like Passwork are where flexibility really shines. Whether you’re using a desktop, laptop, or smartphone, you can securely store your passwords and access them anywhere. That's especially useful for remote teams, who need smooth and secure login experiences.
Browser extensions fill in credentials automatically, cutting down on login friction. You can use Chrome, Firefox, Safari or Edge — your choice. Many password managers support cross-platform synchronization, changes made on one device are instantly available on another.
Password manager pricing and what to expect
Password managers come in all shapes and sizes, and so do the costs. You can get a basic version for free, with the essentials, while premium plans offer advanced security features like two-factor authentication, encrypted password sharing and audit logs. Choosing an easy to use password manager is essential for keeping things simple and secure. Business solutions often include features for multiple users, ensuring secure credential management across the board.
While a free password manager may be sufficient for individuals, businesses should consider paid options to benefit from enterprise-grade security and administrative controls. Scalable plans that grow with your organization's needs can be a cost-effective way to manage security. And the cost of investing in a password manager is often much lower than the financial and reputational damage caused by a data breach.
Organizations that proactively invest in password security mitigate risks and reduce the likelihood of costly security incidents. When you're shopping for the best way to store passwords, consider what matters most to you: encryption, ease of use, and the ability to store passwords securely across different platforms. Look for features like two-factor authentication and secure password sharing for optimal protection.
Getting started with a password manager
How to use a password manager? It’s pretty straightforward — choose a password manager that fits your needs. Consider factors such as encryption strength, compatibility with devices, and business-oriented features if you need them.
Install the software or use a web-based version for cloud-based access
Start storing passwords securely by importing existing credentials or generating new, strong passwords
Enable auto-fill and auto-change to save time and reduce the risk of phishing attacks
Set up two-factor authentication (2FA) for extra security layer against unauthorized access
Password managers also allow users to categorize passwords into folders or groups, making it easier to manage credentials efficiently. Businesses can take advantage of role-based access control (RBAC) to ensure employees only have access to the passwords relevant to their job responsibilities.
Different types of password managers
Cloud-based
Cloud-based solutions store encrypted passwords on remote servers, allowing you to access your credentials from any device. They offer convenience and accessibility, but you have to trust the provider's security measures. Passwork Cloud ensures high-level encryption and secure access, giving businesses full control over their password management while maintaining ease of use.
Self-hosted
Self-hosted solutions store passwords on a company servers rather than the cloud. While they reduce the risk of cloud-based attacks. Self-hosted password managers provide organizations with complete data control, allowing them to implement their own security policies and compliance measures. This makes them ideal for companies that prioritize on-premises data security.
Browser-based
Many web browsers offer built-in password management tools, but they often lack the advanced security features of dedicated solutions. Web browser password manager is better suited for casual users rather than businesses handling sensitive data. These managers may also be vulnerable to browser-based threats or device compromises. A standalone password manager is a more robust choice for organizations that require enterprise-grade security.
Essential features of a reliable password manager
Strong encryption
A secure password manager should use AES-256 encryption to protect stored credentials from cyber threats. This ensures that even if your data is intercepted, it remains unreadable to unauthorized users.
Auto-fill and auto-change
These features simplify login processes and improve password security by automatically updating passwords when needed. Auto-change is particularly useful for regularly updating credentials without manual effort.
Two-factor authentication
Adds an extra layer of security, ensuring that even if a master password is compromised, unauthorized access is prevented. Many password managers support biometric authentication, such as fingerprint or facial recognition, for added protection.
Intuitive and user-friendly interface
A password manager should be easy to navigate, making it simple for users to store, retrieve, and manage credentials effectively.
Stay safe and secure your data with a password manager
Secure password management is a must. If you haven't started using a password manager yet, now is the time to take control of your online security. If you use a password manager what do you as the user need to remember is just a single master password — that's it. Protect your passwords with the help of a password manager and keep them safe from cyber threats.
Passwork is where security and convenience meet-the necessities for businesses that are serious about staying ahead. That means more than just a password manager. It means a robust security system that reduces the risk of human error. By automating password management and giving you secure, centralized access to sensitive data Passwork helps you protect your business in real-time.
Whatever your company size, investing in secure password management just makes sense. Don't wait for a data breach to happen. Take the next step now with Passwork and start protecting what matters most.
Password managers protect your accounts by encrypting credentials, generating strong passwords, and blocking phishing attacks. They help individuals and businesses streamline password management, minimizing risks from weak or reused passwords. Discover their key features in the full article.
Eirik Salmi
Eirik Salmi
Iliya Garakh, CTO
